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As part of the law of contracts, the Latin American civil codes
contain titles or chapters regulating "civil" associations generally.!
The rules set forth therein are also applicable to commercial associa-
tions when the commercial legislation or the commercial customs do
* B.A., San Bartolome (Bogota, Columbia); S.J.D., Universidad Javerana (Bogota, Co-
lumbia); LL.M., Southern Methodist University; Assistant Professor of Law, Southern
Methodist University (on leave 1959-60). Published with the permission of Matthew Bender
& Co.
Abbreviations are as follows:
Art. Article
C.C. Civil Code
C.Co. Code of Commerce
D. Decree (Regulatory)
D-L Decree-Law (or equivalent)
L. Law (Statute)
LGSM Ley General de Sociedades Mercantiles, Mexico. (General Law of Commercial
Associations).
LSRL Ley de Sociedades de Responsabilidad Limitada (Law of Limited Liability Associa-
tions).
The word "association" is used herein as a generic term to include corporations and all
types of partnerships. This is an attempt to translate the Spanish word sociedad which has
that general, broad meaning. It must be noted, however, that the Spanish term asociaci6n,
which could also be translated into the English word "association," is not the equivalent of
sociedad but, in accordance with the terminology used by several civil codes, refers to a par-
ticular type of civil association characterized by the absence of a profit-making purpose
(non-profit making organization). The bibliography of English-language materials on Latin
American associations, or for that matter, on associations in any civil law jurisdiction, is
quite limited. In connection with Latin American associations in general, the following ma-
terial in English may be found useful: (a) The pamphlets issued by the Organization of
American States (Washington, D.C.) under the name of "A Statement of the Laws of
[name of the country] in Matters Affecting Business." (See, for example, the pamphlet on
Colombia, 1953, pp. 22 ff.; Argentina, 1951, pp. 33 ff. (and supplements); Mexico, 1955,
pp. 29 ff.); (b) Somewhat similar pamphlets are also published by the U.S. Department of
Commerce, under the name of "Investments in [name of country]." However, these em-
phasize the economic aspects of doing business in the particular country, rather than the
legal incidents of operations abroad; and (c) Butte, Methods of Doing Business in Latin
America, 8 Law & Contem. Prob. 752 (1941).
The continental European treatises and articles on the law of commercial associations
are basic for the proper understanding and interpretation of the Latin American laws on
this point, not only on account of the substantial unity of principles between European and
Latin American legislation, but also because of the decisive influence that those treatises and
articles have exercised on the Latin American courts and on the legal writers. The following
is a brief bibliography of Italian and French materials on commercial associations in general.
Italy: Ascarelli, Sociedades y Asociaciones Comerciales (Spanish translation), Buenos
Aires, 1947; De Gregorio, Corso di Diritto Commerciale, Imprenditori-Societa, Roma,
Napoli 1952; Brunnetti, Trattato del Diritto delle Societa, 3 vols., Milano, 1948-1950;
Ferrara, Jr., Gli imprenditore e le societ, Milano, 1952; Graziani, Diritto delle Societi,
Napoli, 1951; 5 Messineo, Manual de Derecho Civil y Comercial, Buenos Aires, 1955, pp.
295 ff.; 2 Vivante, Trattato di Diritto Commerciale, Milano, 3rd ed.
France: see I Hamel-Lagarde, Trait6 de Droit Commercial, Paris, 1954, Nos. 379 ff.;
2 Ripert, Tratado Elemental de Derecho Comercial (Spanish Translation), Buenos Aires,
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not have any rules in point.' The codes of commerce provide the
regulations applicable to commercial associations in general and to
the several specific types of these associations.' During the course
of this century, several countries have enacted new statutes govern-
ing the entire field of commercial associations (such is the case of
the Ley General de Sociedades Mercantiles of Mexico,4 for example)
or certain specific types of business associations, particularly the
Sociedades de Responsabilidad Limitada' and the Sociedades Andni-
masr (corporations).
Finally, it must be pointed out that in all Latin American coun-
1954; Escarra et Rault, Les Socift&s Commerciales, 2 vols., Paris (1950-1951); Pic-Kheher,
Des Soci&fs Commerciales, 2 vols., Paris, 1940-1948; Lyon-Caen, Renault et Amiaud, t.
II and II bis, Paris, 1926-1927; Houpin-Bosvieux, Trait6 G~neral Th~orique et Pratique Des
Soci&its, 3 vols., Paris, 1918.
The legal literature on commercial associations is abundant in many of the Latin Ameri-
can countries. The following is a general indication of a few of the most important treatises
on commercial associations in general: Argentina: Fernandez, Codigo de Comercio Comentado,
t. I, vols. 1 and 2, Buenos Aires, 1951; 1 Malagarriga, Tratado Elemental de Derecho Com-
mercial, Buenos Aires, 1951, pp. 165 ff.; 2 Rivarola, Tratado de Derecho Comercial Argen-
tino, Buenos Aires, 1938, pp. 109 ff. Bolivia: Urquidi, Regimen Legal Boliviano, La Paz,
1947, pp. 121 ff. Brazil: Carvalho de Mendonca, Tratado de Direito Comercial Brasileiro,
Vols. III and IV, Rio, 1934-1945 (somewhat out of date, particularly in the part on cor-
porations) ; 1 Ferreira, Instituigoes de Direito Comercial, Rio, 1951, Nos. 194 ff. Colombia:
Pinzon, Curso de Derecho Comercial, Sociedades, Bogoti (mimeograph) 1953-1954; Zuleta,
Conferencias de Derecho Comercial (mimeograph), Bogoti, without date. Mexico: Rodriguez,
Tratado de Sociedades Mercantiles, 2 vols., Mexico City, 1947; Rodriguez, Curso de Derecho
Mercantil, t. I, Mexico City, 1957, pp. 43 ff.; Mantilla Molina, Derecho Mercantil, Mexico
City, 1956; Cormack & Barker, Mexican Mercantile Organization under the New Law, 8 So.
Cal. L. Rev. 197 (1935); Cormack & Barker, Mexican Civil Organization under the New
Code, 7 So. Cal. L. Rev. 195 (1934). Peru: Boesen, Rights and Duties of Foreign Business
under Peruvian Law, Lima, 1953, pp. 215 ff. Uruguay: 2 Mezzera, Curso de Derecho Com-
ercial, Montevideo, 1952. Venezuela: Loreto-Arismendi, Tratado de las Sociedades Civiles y
Mercantiles, Caracas, 1950; Pineda, Principios de Derecho Mercantil, Mrida, 1952; Benson,
Venezuelan Tax, Labor, Corporation Law (loose-leaf service), pp. 461 ff.; Crawford, The
Corporation Law of Venezuela, 12 Tul. L. Rev. 200 (1938).
The above citations are edited when appearing in subsequent footnotes; "ed. cit." will be
used to indicate this deviation from ordinary citation form.
'References are to articles of the Civil Code. Argentina and Paraguay, 1648-1788;
Brazil, 1363-1409; Bolivia, 1200-1237; Chile, 2053-2115; Colombia, 2079-2141; Cuba,
1665-1708; Costa Rica, 1196-1207; Dominican Rep., 1832-1873; Ecuador, 2076-2138;
Guatemala, 1776-1828; Haiti, 1601-1664; Honduras, 1782-1887; Mexico, 2688-2738; Nica-
ragua, 3175-3292; Peru, 1686-1748; Uruguay, 1875-1937; Venezuela, 1649-1683.
aIt is a general principle of commercial law that if there are no rules in the codes of
commerce or in the commercial laws and there is no custom on a particular point, the
standards of the Civil Code will control. In so far as commercial associations are concerned,
this general principle is expressly set forth by some of the Latin American codes. Cf., e.g.,
Dominican Republic, C.C., Art. 1873; Guatemala, C.C., Art. 1828; Bolivia, C.C., Art. 1237
(does not mention commercial customs).
'References are to articles of the Codes of Commerce: Argentina, 282 ff.; Bolivia, 225
ff.; Brazil, 287 ff.; Chile, 348 ff.; Colombia, 463 ff.; Ecuador, 261 ff.; Honduras, 13
ff.; Panama, 249 ff.; Peru, 124 ff.; Uruguay, 387 ff.; Venezuela, 200 ff.
'Promulgated on July 28, 1934, in force since its publication in Aug. 4, 1934 (Diario
Oficial of that date). Also in Costa Rica a Ley de Sociedades Mercantiles (Law of Com-
mercial Associations) was enacted by Law No. 6, of Nov. 24, 1909.
'See pp. 176-93 infra.
6 See pp. 194-220 infra.
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tries there is a large number of statutes regulating in detail certain
kinds of commercial associations such as insurance companies and
credit institutions.7 These specific regulations are beyond the scope
of the present general survey and will not be examined.
As a source of the law of commercial associations, the jurispru-
dencia' and the decisions of the administrative agencies which exercise
control over certain types of commercial associations must be men-
tioned.! Finally, the customs of trade have a special importance in
accounting matters and in other subjects."0
I. ASSOCIATIONS
A. Distinction Between Civil and Commercial Associations
It is very important in practice to distinguish between civil and
commercial associations, among other things, in order to know
whether the civil or the commercial code controls and to determine
whether or not a particular association is subject to the proceedings
of bankruptcy."
Two criteria have been used in order to decide whether an associa-
tion is commercial." The first is the "objective" test, i.e., commer-
cial associations are those the actual purpose or object of which is the
professional and habitual execution of commercial transactions.'3 On
'In Mexico, for example, there is a large number of these special statutes. Among them
we may cite the following: Ley de Sociedades de Responsabilidad Limitada de Inter&s Publico,
Ley de las Sociedades de Invrsi6n, Ley General e Sociedades Cooperativas, Ley de Asociaciones
de Productores, Nueva Ley General de Instituciones de Cr~dito.
s The body of court decisions or case law.
eSee pp. 204-05 infra.
"°See p. 196 infra.
" In the civil law jurisdictions bankruptcy is a proceeding reserved for merchants, either
individual or collective (associations). Other persons are subject to the "concurso de acree-
dores" or some other proceeding set forth in the civil codes for insolvency of persons who
are not merchants.
"See in this connection, 1 Hamel-Lagarde, TraitS, td. cit., Nos. 432 ff. (1954); 1 Rodri-
guez, Sociedades, ed. cit., pp. 8 ff.
" A full discussion of what is meant by "commercial transactions" in the civil law
jurisdictions is beyond the scope of this paper. In Latin America, as a general rule, the fol-
lowing are commercial transactions:
(a) Buying of goods for the purpose of reselling them at a profit, either in their
original state or after a process of manufacturing; banking operations; exchange of
currencies; corretage, i.e., the bringing together of seller and buyer of chattels or
securities;
(b) If performed by an enterprise organized for that purpose, the following are
commercial transactions: transportation of persons or cargo; services rendered by
public utility companies or enterprises organized for the purpose of periodic services
to a large number of customers; acts performed by commercial agents; auction sales;
insurance operations; warehouse transactions; and
(c) Finally, in each country statutes have been enacted declaring to be commercial
certain transactions which are not usually regarded as such.
On the other hand, the following are not commercial transactions:
(a) Farming operations;
(b) Transactions relating to immovables (real property); and
(c) Mining and oil and gas transactions.
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
the other hand, civil associations are those engaged in non-commercial
("civil") transactions. It must be emphasized that it is the trans-
actions actually conducted which are controlling, although they
may be different from the object or purpose stated in the contract of
association."
The objective test is the criterion generally followed by the Latin
American countries,'5 subject to the following exceptions and quali-
fications: (a) The laws of some countries such as Argentina provide
that the Sociedades de Responsabilidad Limitada and the Sociedades
An6nimas (corporations) are always regarded as commercial concerns
without taking into consideration their aim or purpose.'" This is also
the French approach to this problem,'7 and it constitutes the better
and modern view. However, many Latin American countries such
as Chile and Colombia apply the test of the object or purpose to the
Sociedades de Responsabilidad Limitada and to the Sociedades An6ni-
mas (corporations). Therefore under the laws of these two countries
the Sociedad de Kesponsabilidad Limitada and the Sociedad An6nima
may be either commercial or civil, depending upon their object
or purposes;'" and (b) The laws of several Latin American countries
authorize civil associations to be organized not in pursuance
of the rules of the civil code but in accordance with the norms of
the code of commerce. In other words, it is possible in several coun-
tries to organize a civil association under one of the forms or types
14 Argentina, 1 Camara de Apelaciones en lo Comercial, Criminal y Correccional (Fallos,
p. 139). Contra, 1 Camara 2a. de Apelaciones de Cordoba, June 10, 1940 ("Justicia," Cor-
doba, p. 198). See also I Malagarriga, Tratado, pp. 185 ff.
15 Argentina, C.Co., Art. 282 except that the Sociedades de Responsabilidad Limitada
and the Sociedades An6nimas are always commercial, regardless of their object. See note 17
infra. Bolivia, see discussion in Urquidi, Regimen, p. 123. The author appears to assume the
application in Bolivia of this general rule. Brazil, 1 Ferreira, Instituiqoes, ed. cit., Nos. 203 ff.
Chile, C.C., Art. 2059. Colombia, C.C., Art. 2085. Cuba, C.C., Art. 1670 (by implication).
Ecuador, C.C., Art. 2082; C.Co., Art. 261. Panama, C.C., Art. 1361 (by implication);
C.Co., Art. 249. Venezuela, C.C., Art. 1651 (by implication, see proceedings of the Camara
de Diputados, Session of October 7, 1942, intervention of the Hon. Ramirez MacGregor
(D. de D. No. 51), C.Co., Art. 200. Costa Rica, C.C., Arts. 1206 and 1207 (by implica-
tion). Nicaragua, C.C., Arts. 3191, 3192. Uruguay, C.C., Art. 1886 (by implication). Cf.
2 Mezzera Alvarez, Curso, ed. cit., No. 178. (This general rule is not applied to the So-
ciedades de Responsabilidad Limitada, the Sociedades An6nimas, and the Cooperatives, which
are always commercial.)
"Argentina, L. 11645, Art. 3 (Sociedades de Responsabilidad Limitada); C.Co., Arts.
8(6), 282(2) and 313 (Sociedades An6nimas); Uruguay, C.Co., Art. 403 (Sociedades An6-
nimas); Decreto Legislativo No. 8992, April 26, 1933, Art. 2 (Sociedades de Responsabilidad
Limitada); Panama, C.Co., Art. 249 (Sociedades An6nimas). On the other hand the So-
ciedad de Responsabilidad Limitada may be either civil or commercial, depending upon its
object or purpose, in Colombia (L. 124 of 1937, Art. 1) and in Chile. Also in these two
countries and in Ecuador, although the Sociedades An6nimas are subject to the regulations
of the Code of Commerce (Colombia, C.C., Art. 2090; Chile, C.C., Art. 2064; Ecuador,
C.C., Art. 2087), they maintain their status of Civil Associations if their object is not com-
mercial.
17 1 Hamel-Lagarde, Trait6, ed. cit., No. 434.
"Hamel-Lagarde, supra note 17.
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of commercial associations.'" It is the writer's opinion that even in
this case the association will remain a "civil" one and will not become
commercial. However, it must be observed that in this hypothesis
the commercial law is applicable to "civil" associations in matters
which are not contrary to the civil code and also that in Brazil a civil
association organized under a commercial form is subject to the com-
mercial legislation for all purposes, except jurisdiction and registra-
tion."
The second test to determine whether a particular association is
commercial is a "formal" test. All associations which assume a com-
mercial form, i.e., one of the forms or structures regulated by the
commercial laws, will be regarded as commercial associations what-
ever their purpose or object of exploitation might be. Under this
formal test the following associations will be commercial: (a) the
associations which have a commercial purpose or object, because they
must be organized in accordance with the commercial laws; and (b)
the associations which have a "civil" object of exploitation but which
have been organized in pursuance to the commercial laws. The formal
test is applied by the Mexican General Law of Commercial Associa-
tions" and by the Peruvian"2 and Hondurian" Codes of Commerce.
This analysis will be confined to commercial associations, but as
stated previously, most of the rules relating to commercial associa-
tions may be or are applicable to civil associations as well.
B. Types of Commercial Associations Generally Recognized
by the Latin American Statutes
The following are the types of commercial associations usually
recognized by the Latin American statutes: 4
(1) Sociedad Colectiva
"Brazil, C.C., Art. 1364; Chile, C.C., Art. 2060 (by implication); Colombia, C.C.,
Art. 2086 (by implication); Costa Rica, C.C., Art. 1207 (by implication); Cuba, C.C., Art.
1670; Ecuador, C.C., Art. 2083 (by implication); Uruguay, C.C., Art. 1886 (by implica-
tion); Venezuela, C.C., Art. 1651 (2); Nicaragua, C.C., Art. 3192 (by implication); Pana-
mi, C.C., Art. 1361.
2sC.C., Art. 1364.
2' Art. 4.
22 Arts. 124 and 1(2).
2
' Art. 13.
24 In Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay, and other countries the law of commercial associations
does not list associations by specific types. However, the types I have listed are recognized
and carefully regulated. In other countries the laws enumerate the different types of com-
mercial associations which may be organized. Most of the codes of commerce do not mention
the Sociedades de Responsabilidad Limitada, which have been the object of subsequent regu-
lation by special statutes, as will be seen later. The Codes of Commerce of Honduras and
Venezuela and the LGSM of Mexico do mention and regulate the Sociedad de Responsabill-
dad Limitada. Below are cited the articles of several Latin American Commercial Codes
where the different types of commercial associations are listed: Bolivia, 225; Chile, 348;
Colombia, 463; Ecuador, 262; Honduras, 13; Mexico, LGSM, 1; Peru, 130; Venezuela, 201.
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(2) Sociedad en Comandita
(3) Sociedad de Responsabilidad Limitada
(4) Sociedades An6nimas
(5) Sociedad Accidental o de Cuentas en Participatci6n 22
(6) The commercial laws of some of the Latin American coun-
tries regulate also certain other types of associations which are
not very frequently used in practice, such as the Sociedad de
Capital e Industria.8 Also cooperativas are regarded in some
countries and by some legal writers as commercial associa-
tions."
In accordance with the civil law classification of commercial asso-
ciations the Sociedades Colectivas and the Sociedades en Comandita
Simple are "associations of persons" (sociedades de personas). On
the other hand the Sociedades An6nimas (corporations) and the
Socidades en Comandita por Acciones are referred to as "associations
of capital" (sociedades de capital). The Sociedad de Responsabilidad
Limitada is considered as an intermediate type of association which
has some of the characteristics of the "associations of capital" and
some of the characteristics of the "associations of persons." The
classification of associations into associations of persons and associa-
tions of capital is based to a large extent upon whether the persons
who are the members of the association, or the capital which is con-
tributed, is the factor which controls the characteristics and the
regulation of the particular type of association."8
This paper is concerned primarily with the Sociedades de Respon-
sabilidad Liinitada2" and the Sociedades An6nimas" (corporations)
which are the two most important types of business associations. As
to Sociedades Colectivas and Sociedades en Comandita we shall say just
a few words here."' The other types of commercial associations will
not be discussed in this paper.
2' The following countries have established the sociedad de cuentas en participaci6n
(references are to the codes of commerce.): Argentina, 395 ff.; Bolivia, 229 and 288 ff.;
Brazil, 325 ff.; Chile, 507 ff.; Colombia, 629 ff.; Panami, 489 ff.; Peru, 232 ff.; Uruguay,
444 ff.; Venezuela, 359 ff.
26Argentina, 383 ff.; Brazil, 317 ff.; Uruguay, 435 ff. (references are to the codes of
commerce).
17 See, e.g., the LGSM of Mexico, Art. I (VI). See also commentaries and comparative
remarks in connection with this precept in 2 Rodriguez, Sociedades, ed. cit., p. 519; Hon-
duras, C.Co., Art. 13 (VI).
28 1 Hamel-Lagarde, TraitS, ed. cit., No. 436.
29See pp. 176-93 infra.
3See pp. 194-210 infra.31 See pp. 175-76 infra.
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C. The Sociedad Colectivaa
The Sociedad Colectiva is the civil law counterpart of the general
partnership of the Anglo-American law. Its regulation in Latin Amer-
ica is strikingly similar to the regulation of general partnerships con-
tained in the Uniform Partnership Act of the United States. There
are, however, several differences between them, both as to essential
points and as to matters of detail, of which only two will be men-
tioned. First, the Sociedad Colectiva must practically always be
created by a private writing or by a notarial contract, and an abstract
of the contract must be recorded in the Public Register of Commerce
(Registro Publico de Comercio)." Secondly, the Sociedad Colectiva,
unlike the general partnership, has juristic personality." Therefore,
it possesses a domicile and a capital separate from the capital of the
partners; it has title to the assets of the association, and it may sell
those assets and buy new assets in its own name; and finally, the
association may sue and be sued as such.
D. Sociedades en Comandita (Limited Partnerships)
The Sociedades en Comandita are of two different kinds: simple
(without shares) and por acciones (with shares of stock).
The Sociedad en Comandita Simple (without shares of stock)" s is
almost identical in regulation and characteristics with the limited
"s The following articles of the codes of commerce regulate the sociedades colectivas
in the countries listed. Argentina, 301-312; Bolivia, 226, 237 ff.; Brazil, 315 ff.; Chile,
349 ff.; Colombia, 464 ff.; Ecuador, 267 ff.; Honduras, 38 ff.; Mexico (LGSM), 25 ff.;
Panama, 297 ff.; Peru, 133 ft.; Venezuela, 227 ft.
" Not only the sociedades colectivas but also all other commercial associations, except
the cuentas en participaci6n, must be generally created in writing, which in certain cases
must be a "notarial" contract, and an abstract of the articles of association must be recorded
in the Public Register of Commerce. Only very limited exceptions are made to this general
rule. In Argentina, for example, the sociedades colectivas may be created by an oral contract
only when their capital is less than 1.000 pesos. A list of the articles of codes of com-
merce which refer to the problem of formalities for the organization of associations gen-
erally and of sociedades colectivas in particular is given below: Argentina, 289-96, 39, 41;
Bolivia, 231 ff. and D.L. of April 28, 1937, particularly arts. 6-12; Brazil, 300 ff.;
Chile, 350 ff.; Colombia, 465 ff.; Eucador, 337 ff.; Honduras, 14 ff.; Mexico, LGSM, 5 &
2; Panama, 287 ff.; Peru, 127, 133; Uruguay, 393 ff.; Venezuela, 212 ff.
" In Latin America all commercial associations, except the cuentas en participaci6n, have
juristic personality, independent and separate from the partners or shareholders. This is a
very well-known principle, universally accepted by the writers and by the courts, even when
not specifically expressed in the codes. Argentina, 1 Fernindez, C6digo, ed. cit., pp. 384
ff.; Bolivia, Urquidi, R6gimen, ed. cit., pp. 121 ff.; Brazil, 1 Ferreira, Instituigoes, ed. cit.,
Nos. 216 ff.; Chile, C.C. 2053; Colombia, C.C. 2079 and 633. See also Pinz6n, Curso (so-
ciedades), ed. cit., pp. 42 ff.; Ecuador, 262 and 2076; Honduras, 15; Mexico, LGSM 2;
Panama, 251; Peru, 124 (2); Venezuela, 201 to the contrary, and C.C., Art. 1651.
"' The following articles of codes of commerce refer to the sociedad en comandita sim-
ple: Argentina, 372 ff.; Bolivia, 227, 245 ff.; Brazil, 331 ff.; Chile, 470-490; Colombia,
596-612; Ecuador, 275 ff.; Honduras, 58 ff.; Mexico, LGSM, 51 ff.; Panama, 330 ff.; Peru,
153 ff.; Uruguay, 426 ff.; Venezuela, 235 ff.
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partnership of the U.S., the only important difference being that the
Sociedad en Comandita Simple has separate juristic personality.'" The
Sociedad en Comandita por Acciones (with shares) 7 is a limited part-
nership in which the interest or part of the limited partners is rep-
resented in shares of stock, easily negotiable. This type of association
is not very popular at the present time because the Sociedad An6nima
(corporation) offers more advantages than the Sociedad en Co-mandita
por Acciones. The rules applicable to the Sociedad en Comandita por
Acciones (with shares) have many similarities with the rules ap-
plicable to corporations.
II. SOCIEDADES DE RESPONSABILIDAD LIMITADAa s
A. General Considerations
First a word of caution in connection with the terminology used
in this Article. A Sociedad de Responsabilidad Limitada is a type of
business association different from the "limited partnership." As
stated, the civil law counterpart of the limited partnership is the
Sociedad en Comandita, which differs basically from the Sociedad de
Responsabilidad Limitada." Because of the fact that there is no
English term into which the Spanish term Sociedad de Responsabilidad
Limitada can be translated adequately, the Spanish original is used
for discussional purposes.
In the U.S., prior to the enactment of more liberal laws regulating
the incorporation and operation of corporations, several states passed
statutes allowing the creation of "limited liability associations," in
which the liability of all partners was limited. ° Today, as a result
of the modern corporations acts, the "limited liability association"
a"Authorities cited note 34 supra.
" The sociedad en comandita por acciones is regulated by the following articles of the
codes of commerce: Argentina, 380 ff.; Bolovia, 244; Brazil, D.L. 2627 of Sept. 26, 1940,
arts. 163 ff.; Chile, 470-473, 491-506; Colombia, 597, 613 ff.; Ecuador, 282 ff.;
Honduras, 271 ff.; Mexico, LGSM, 207 ff.; Panama, 347 ft.; Uruguay, 433 ff.; Venezuela,
201 (2) and 245 ff.
3"See generally Soli Caflizares-Aztria, Sociedades de Responsabilidad Limitada, 2 vols.,
1950-1954. This book is basic for the study of the Sociedad de Responsabilidad Limitada
in Latin America, and it has proved very useful in the preparation of this paper. An ex-
tensive bibliography on the Sociedades de Responsabilidad Limitada in Europe and in Latin
America is found beginning at page 71 of that book. See also the general bibliography on
associations in Latin America at beginning of this article. The English literature on this point
is very limited. See, among others, Crawford, The Argentine Limited Liability Company,
14 Tul. L. Rev. 232 (1940); Crawford, The Mexican Limited Liability Company, 13 Tul.
L. Rev. 258 (1939); Eder, Limited Liability Firms Abroad, 13 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 193 (1952);
Eder, Venezuela Commercial Code; Limited Liability Firms, 5 Am. J. Comp. L. 628 (1956).
9 See p. 175 supra.
" Crane, Partnership 118-20 (1952).
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is seldom used, except to some extent in Pennsylvania41 and in Michi-
42gan.
In England the "private companies" offer some points of similarity
with the Sociedad de Responsabilidad Limitada; apparently they were
taken as a pattern by the German law which first allowed and reg-
ulated the establishment of Sociedades de Responsabilidad Limitada
in the civil law world." However, between the Sociedad de Respon-,
sabilidad Limitada and the English "private company" there are now
many basic differences which render any analogy between them quite
remote.
The Sociedad de Responsabilidad Limitada is a fairly recent devel-
opment in the civil law system. The French, Spanish, and Latin
American commercial codes of the 19th century did not mention it.
A German law of April 1892 introduced the Sociedad de Respon-,
sabilidad Limitada (Gesellschaft mit beschrainkter Haftung, ab-
breviated G.m.b.H.) in a general manner. The German idea of
regulating a Sociedad de Responsabilidad Limitada was followed by
Portugal (1901), France (1925), Belgium (1935), Switzerland
(1936), and more recently by Italy (1942) and Spain (1953)."
In Latin America the first country to adopt the Sociedad de Re-
sponsabilidad Limitada was Brazil in 1919, and the last one was
Venezuela in 1955. At the present time all Latin American countries
have authorized and regulated the Sociedad de Responsabilidad Limit-
ada" with the exception of Peru,"5 the Dominican Republic," Ecua-
41 59 P.S. § 341; Warren, Corporate Advantages without Incorporation, 508-25 (1929).
42 Mich. Stat. Ann. § 20.92 (1959); other examples are found in N.J. Stat. Ann. 42:
3-1-14 (1937); 17 Pages Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 1783.12 (1953).
431 Soli-Aztiria, Sociedades de Responsabilidad Limitada, pp. 4 ff.
44 It must be noted that in Spain, prior to the Law of 1953, the Sociedad de Responsa-
bilidad Limitada had been recognized and authorized by the courts.
45 Argentina, Law 11645 of Oct. 8, 1932; Bolivia, Law of March 12, 1941; Brazil, De-
cree 3708 of Jan. 10, 1919; Chile, Law of March 14, 1923; Colombia, Law 124 of Nov.
24, 1937; Cuba, Law of April 17, 1929; Costa Rica, Law of Aug. 25, 1942; Guatemala,
Code of Commerce (1942), Arts. 445 ff.; Honduras, Code of Commerce (Decree No. 73
of Feb. 16, 1950), Arts. 66 ff.; Mexico, Ley General de Sociedades Mercantiles (LGSM),
July 28, 1934, Arts. 58 ff.; Nicaragua, Code of Commerce, Art. 137; Paraguay, Law
10268 of Dec. 29, 1941; PanamA, Code of Commerce, Art. 327; Uruguay, Decree-Law
8.992 of April 26, 1933; Venezuela, Code of Commerce (1955), Arts. 312 ff. In connection
with Nicaragua, article 137 of the Code of Commerce authorizes the general partner in a
sociedad en comandita (limited partnership) to limit his liability by an appropriate clause
to this effect in the contract of partnership. Although some authors have doubted whether
such a clause may be effective against third parties, I am inclined to believe it is. Article
137 provides that if the clause of limited liability is included in the contract, then the word
"limited" must be added to the name of the partnership. This indicates that the limited
liability of the partners is something which may affect third persons. Assuming that this is
the proper construction of article 137, it in effect authorizes the creation of Sociedades de
Responsabilidad Limitada by providing that the general partner or partners in a sociedad en
comandita (limited partnership) may limit their liability.
46 However, in Peru, article 1726 of the Civil Code allows the creation of "civil" Soci-
edades de Responsabilidad Limitada.
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dor,'" El Salvador, and Haiti.
Because of the fact that the Sociedad de Responsabilidad Limitada
is of recent origin, there is no uniformity among the civil law
countries in its regulation, and the rules adopted by some nations in
connection with this type of association are deficient.
B. General Characteristics
49
The Sociedad de Responsabilidad Limitada is a type of business
association intermediate between the partnership and the corporation,
its fundamental characteristic being the limited liability of all the
partners. It was established in order to suit the needs of the enter-
prises of medium size by offering limited liability to the partners in
order to attract capital and, at the same time, by reducing the
expenses and difficulties which the organization and operation of a
corporation entail in Latin America. However, due to its deficient
regulation, it may be, and in fact often is, used in most countries by
large enterprises as well.
The Sociedad de Responsabilidad Limitada constitutes an excellent
device for doing business in Latin America, and it seems amazing
that it has not been used more extensively by American investors in
their operations abroad. It is the writer's suggestion that whenever
an American investor contemplates the organization of an association
in one of the Latin American countries, he should consider the pos-
sibility of establishing a Sociedad de Responsabilidad Limitada,
weighing the advantages and the disadvantages that this type of
association offers when compared with other business devices such
as the corporation.
As compared with a corporation the Sociedad de Responsabilidad
Limitada presents the following general advantages. In the first
place its organization is less difficult and less expensive than that of
a corporation. In particular, no governmental authorization is re-
quired, at least in most Latin American countries."° In the second
place, it may be more closely held and controlled than a corporation
and its operation is less complicated. Finally, in some countries the
taxes imposed upon the Sociedad de Responsabilidad Limitada are
" The draft for the new Code of Commerce of the Dominican Republic authorizes and
regulates the Sociedad de Responsabilidad Limitada (Ducoudray, Proyecto de C6digo de
Comercio, Ciudad Trujillo (1947)).
48 See Romero, Las Compaflias de Comercio en el Ecuador 218 ff. (1958), in which
the author strongly advocates the adoption of this type of association in Ecuador. He also
presents a draft of a statute regulating the Sociedad de Responsabilidad Limitada. This draft
follows the general lines of the Chilean and Colombian laws.
"S ee 1 Soli-Aztiria, op. cit. supra note 43, pp. 29 ff.
5'See p. 183 infra.
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lower than those imposed upon a corporation.5 On the other hand,
the Sociedad de Responsabilidad Limitada has a few disadvantages,
mainly in two respects. Because of defects in its regulation, the
Sociedad de Responsabilidad Limitada does not offer, in some coun-
tries, sufficient security to potential creditors." In the second place,
the conveyance of the right or interest that a partner has in a
Sociedad de Responsabilidad Limitada is subject to certain require-
ments which do not exist in connection with the negotiation of
shares of stock.
C. Different Systems of Regulation
The regulation of the Sociedad de Responsabilidad Limitada is not
uniform in Latin America. For the purposes of discussion the statutes
may be divided into three groups.
(1) In some countries, e.g., Panam 5s and Nicaragua,"4 the codes
of commerce merely provide that it is possible for the partners in a
general partnership or in a limited partnership to agree that their
liability will be limited. This limitation on the liability of the partners
will be operative as to third persons, although there is some doubt in
this respect in Nicaragua." A somewhat similar situation exists in
Chile, where, although there is a special statute on Sociedades de
Responsabilidad Limitada, it deals mainly with the formal organiza-
tional requisites and provides that in all other matters the Sociedad de
Responsabilidad Limitada will be subject to the regulations and prin-
ciples of the Sociedad Colectiva." The defects of this system are
clear: the partnership is a form of business association based upon the
unlimited liability of at least some of the partners and it may not
satisfactorily be utilized as an association (such as the Sociedad de
Responsabilidad Linitada) in which the liability of all the partners
is limited, without greatly endangering the position of potential
" This is the case in Colombia where the Sociedades de Responsabilidad Limitada are
subject to a tax of only 3% of the taxable income (Art. 10, Decreto Legislativo 3211 of
1953), whereas corporations are taxed according to a progressive tariff of up to 31Y49o%
(Decreto Legislativo 2317 of 1953, Art. 15). Only corporations with less than 5.000 pesos
(U.S. $633 approximately) are subject to a tax lower than the 3% with which the So-
ciedades de Responsabilidad Limitada are taxed.
a" This is particularly true in countries like Panami and Nicaragua where the rules of the
Sociedad Colectiva (general partnership) are applied to the Sociedades de Responsabilidad
Limitada, because the whole regulation of the Sociedades Colectivas is based upon the as-
sumption that the partners will be unlimitedly liable to the creditors for the acts and
transactions of the partnership and therefore not many limitations are imposed for the pro-
tection of the capital of the partnership.
"' C.Co., Art. 327.
4 C.Co., Art. 137.
" Authorities cited note 45 supra.
se LSRL, Art. 4(2).
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creditors. Furthermore, the partnership form is useful primarily in
connection with small enterprises and its structure is not adequate
for the larger enterprises which are frequently organized as Sociedades
de Responsabilidad Lirnitada.
(2) The statutes of Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Honduras, Mexico,
Uruguay, and Venezuela set up a fairly detailed scheme for the organi-
zation, operation, and other incidents of the Sociedad de Responsabili-
dad Limitada. The scheme provided for is intermediate between the
rigid and simple set-up of the partnership and the more elastic but
also more complex regulation of the corporate form."'
(3) The Colombian statute is an example of a middle-road be-
tween the two systems discussed above. It bases the regulation of the
Sociedad de Responsabilidad Limitada on the principles, rules, and
ideas governing the partnership, but has also introduced a few amend-
ments and modifications to those principles, rules, and ideas. The re-
sult is a better system than the one followed by the countries men-
tioned in the first group, but still affected by many deficiencies and
inconveniences.
Finally, it must be mentioned that in some countries, such as
Chile,58 Columbia," Uruguay,"' Panama, 1 and Nicaragua" the rules
of the Sociedad Colectiva are applicable to the Sociedad de Responsa-
bilidad Linitada in the absence of a special provision to the contrary.
On the other hand, in Brazil the rules of the Sociedad An6nima are
applicable;"5 in Venezuela, the rules concerning the Sociedad An6nima
and the Sociedad Colectiva; 64 and in Argentina" and Bolivia,6 the
commercial and civil laws, in general.
D. Liability of the Partners
The basic characteristic of a Sociedad de Responsabilidad Limitada is
the limited liability of the partners. In Latin America, as a general
rule, the liability of each partner is limited to the payment of the
" It must be noted, however, that in Argentina, if the Sociedad de Responsabilidad
Limitada does not have more than 5 partners, its regulation is similar in some respects to
that of a Sociedad Colectiva.
s LSRL, Art. 4(2).
5 LSRL, Art. 11.
66 LSRL, Art. 18.
81 C.Co., Art. 327.
6 2 C.Co., Art. 137.
63 LSRL, Art. 18.
64 C.Co., Art. 336.
6' LSRL, Art. 24.
66 LSRL, Art. 18.
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amount which he subscribed." There are, however, several exceptions
to this general rule in the various countries. For example, in Colom-
bia the partners may agree to additional liability; 8 in Brazil, in case
of bankruptcy of the association, the partners are jointly liable for
the amount of the parts or interests not yet fully paid;"' and in
Argentina, Bolivia, Colombia, and Venezuela the founding partners
are jointly liable for the effective contribution and proper valuation
of that part of the capital which was not paid in cash.7" Finally, it
must be mentioned that in Argentina, Mexico, and Honduras, the
partners may promise additional contributions to a Sociedad de Re-
sponsabilidad Liinitada, but generally this obligation is not enforce-
able by third persons, until the association has decided and formally
announced the "integration" of the additional contributions.7'
E. Organization-Substantive and Formal Requirements:
juristic Personality
The general rule in Latin America is that two partners are sufficient
to create a Sociedad de Responsabilidad Limitada.2 The only excep-
tion is found in Bolivia, which requires at least three partners."
In order to prevent the Sociedad de Responsabilidad Limitada from
being used by large enterprises, most Latin American statutes have
limited the maximum number of partners." In Chile the maximum
is 50; in Mexico, Bolivia, and Paraguay, 25; in Colombia, 20; in Ar-
gentina and Uruguay, 20 plus 5 employees;7" and in Cuba, 10.6
In Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Guatemala, Nicaragua, and Panama the
law has not determined either a maximum or a minimum capital.
67Argentina, LSRL, Art. 11 (1st); Bolivia, LSRL, Art. 2; Chile, LSRL, Art. 1; Co-
lombia, LSRL, Art. 1; Honduras, C.Co., Art. 66; Mexico, LGSM, Art. 58; Uruguay,
LSRL, Art. 4; Venezuela, C.Co., Art. 312. In some other countries, such as Brazil, for
example, this principle was not expressly set forth by the legislature, probably because it
is too well known and generally accepted.
68 LSRL, Art. 1.
69 LSRL, Art. 9.
76Argentina, LSRL, Art. 10(3); Bolivia, LSRL, Art. 8; Colombia, LSRL, Art. 2(3);
Venezuela, C.Co., Art. 313 (4).
71 This is the Argentinian rule (LSRL, Art. 11, 2nd and 3rd). Similar provisions are
found in Mexico (LGSM, Art. 70) and Honduras (C.Co., Art. 75).
" This principle has not been expressly set forth in connection with the Sociedad de
Responsabilidad Limitada, but there is a general rule in the law of associations that two
persons are enough to organize a company, unless otherwise provided by the legislature.
73 LSRL, Art. 3.
7' The exceptions to this general rule are: Brazil, Costa Rica, Nicaragua, Panami, and
Venezuela.
" Argentina, LSRL, Art. 8; Bolivia, LSRL, Art. 3; Chile, LSRL, Art. 2; Colombia,
LSRL, Art. 5; Guatemala, C.Co., Art. 445; Honduras, C.Co., Art. 69 (maximum of 25
partners); Mexico, LGSM, Art. 61; Paraguay, Art. 25; Uruguay, LSRL, Art. 7.
76 LSRL, Art. 1(a). Also, if the number of partners exceeds 5, a supervisory committee
must be appointed by the partners in order to check the activities of the managers (LSRL,
Art. 1 LL).
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On the other hand, Uruguay and Venezuela have limited both the
minimum and the maximum capital." In Venezuela the minimum
capital is 20,000 Bolivars (about $6,000) and the maximum is
2,000,000 Bolivars (about $600,000). In Argentina, Bolivia, Cuba,
Honduras, Mexico, and Paraguay the law has not established a maxi-
mum capital but it has provided for a minimum capital." In Argen-
tina and Mexico the minimum capital is 5,000 pesos. Due to
inflationary factors this amount has become almost nominal in Argen-
tina ($55) and very low in Mexico ($400).
The general rule is that the capital must be entirely subscribed."
In some countries the subscription of capital must always be private,
public offering being forbidden by law."0 Some countries, e.g., Bolivia,
Colombia, and Guatemala, require also the payment of the entire
capital which is subscribed."' This, however, is not the general
rule. In most countries the law simply requires that at least 50% of
the subscription made by each one of the partners be paid before
final organization. s2
Cash and practically any kind of tangible or intangible property
may be agreed upon as consideration under a subscription agreement.
However, in most countries services to be rendered in the future
may not be the object of a valid contribution. s3
"7 Uruguay, LSRL, Art. 8 (not less than 5.000 and no more than 1.000.000 pesos);
Venezuela, C.Co., Art. 315.
78 Argentina, LSRL, Art. 9; Mexico, LGSM, Art. 62; Bolivia, LSRL, Art. 5 (50.000
bolivianos); Cuba, Law of Dec. 13, 1929 (5.000 pesos); Honduras, C.Co., Art. 70 (5.000
lempiras); Paraguay, LSRL, Art. 7 (500.000 pesos).
7 Argentina, LSRL. Art. 10; Bolivia, LSRL, Art. 7; Colombia, LSRL, Art. 2(2),
3; Honduras, C.Co., Art. 71; Mexico, LGSM, Art. 64; Venezuela, C.Co., Art. 313; Brazil,
D-L. 2627, Art. 38(1); Chile, C.Co., Art. 375 (by implication).
S"Honduras, C.Co., Art. 72; Mexico, LGSM, Art. 63.
SBolivia, LSRL, Art. 7; Colombia, LSRL, Art. 2(2), 3; Guatemala, C.Co., Art.
446. According to Soli-Aztiria, this is also the rule in Cuba. Sociedades de Responsabilidad
Limitada, vol. I, p. 347 (1950-1954).
8 Argentina, LSRL, Art. 10 (but subscriptions other than in cash must be fully paid);
Honduras, C.Co., Art. 71; Mexico, LGSM, Art. 64; Paraguay, LSRL, Art. 8; Uruguay,
LSRL, Art. 9 (but subscriptions other than in cash must be fully paid); Venezuela, C.Co.,
Art. 313. In Brazil, the D-L 2627 (1940), article 38(2) which must be applied by
analogy to the Sociedad de Responsabilidad Limitada requires the payment of only
10% of the subscribed capital. In Chile, Panami, and Nicaragua, no minimum paid-in
capital is set forth by the law.
"5Expressly: Brazil, LSRL, Art. 4. By implication: Argentina, LSRL, Art. 10; Bolivia,
LSRL, Art. 8; Guatemala, C.Co., Art. 446; Mexico 1 Soli-Aztiria, Sociedades de Responsa-
bilidad Limitada, pp. 389 ff.; Uruguay, LSRI, Art. 9. The situation in Colombia is doubtful.
Art. 6 of the LSRL seems to authorize the existence of "industrial partners" in a Sociedad de
Responsabilidad Limitada but restricts their right to participate in the dividends of the as-
sociation. On the other hand the supreme court has put in doubt the possibility of having
industrial partners in a Sociedad de Responsabilidad Limitada (Sentencia, 28 abril, 1952,
LXXI, 776). Among the legal writers there is a split of authority in this connection. Dr.
Zuleta is against and Dr. Villa Uribe favors the possibility of having "industrial partners"
in a Sociedad de Responsabilidad Limitada (Ortega-Torres, C6digo de Comercio Terrestre,
550 ff., 1953). In Chile, Panami, and Nicaragua, the contribution of work or services is
apparently allowed.
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The Sociedad de Responsabilidad Limitada must always be created
by a written instrument. In Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay, and Vene-
zuela 4 a private document is enough, but this is not so in Bolivia,
Chile, Colombia, Cuba, Honduras, Mexico, and other countries where
a notarial contract is required. 5 In all countries an abstract of the
document of association must be recorded in the Public Register of
Commerce,"6 and in some countries, e.g., Chile, this abstract must also
be published in a newspaper, ordinarily in the official newspaper."7
As a general rule the authorization of the government is not neces-
sary in order to create a Sociedad de Responsabilidad Limitada. How-
ever, in Brazil foreign Sociedades de Responsabilidad Limitada must
have such authorization " and in Mexico it is required not only for
the legal operation of foreign Sociedades de Responsabilidad Limitada,
but also for any such association if there are foreign partners.
Once the requirements stated above have been fulfilled, the
Sociedad de Responsabilidad Limitada emerges as a juristic person.
In most countries it will be regarded always as a commercial associa-
tion; in Colombia and Chile the association will be commercial
only if its purposes are commercial.'
The object or purpose of a Sociedad de Responsabilidad Limitada
may be any legal purpose or object not expressly forbidden by the
law. In some statutes there are several kinds of business which may
not be carried on in this form. In Argentina, for example, insurance,
capitalization, and savings institutions may not adopt the form of
Sociedades de Responsabilidad Limitada.5
F. Partners-Their Interest in the Association
There is no provision relating to the Sociedad de Responsabilidad
Limitada prohibiting foreigners from being partners. However, in
Mexico and some other countries, there are general rules forbidding
9
4 Argentina, LSRL, Art. 4; Brazil, LSRL, Art. 2 and C.Co., Arts. 300 and 302; Uru-
guay, LSRL, Art. 5; Venezuela, C.Co., Arts. 211 and 214.
8"Bolivia, LSRL, Art. 2 and C.Co., Art. 231; Chile, LSRL, Art. 2 and C.Co., Art. 352;
Colombia, LSRL, Art. 2 & C.Co., Art. 467; Honduras, C.Co., Art. 14; Mexico, LGSM,
Art. 5.S Argentina, LSRL, Arts. 5, 6; Brazil, LSRL, Art. 2 & C.Co. Art. 301; Chile,
LSRL, Art. 3 & C.Co. Art. 354; Colombia, LSRL, Art. & C.Co. Art. 469; Hon-
duras, C.Co., Art. 77; Uruguay, LSRL, Art. 6; Venezuela, C.Co., Art. 212. See also supra,
note 33.
87 Chile, LSRL. Art. 3 (2). See also Argentina, LSRL, Arts. 5, 6; Colombia, LSRL,
Art. 3; Uruguay, LSRL, Art. 6; Venezuela, C.Co., Art. 212.
88 D-L 2627 (1940), Art. 63, by analogy.
o I Soli-Aztiria, Sociedades de Responsabilidad Limitada, p. 492 (1950-54).
o Authorities cited note 34 supra.
81 See p. 172 supra.
85 Argentina, LSRL, Art. 3 as amended by law 12156. See similar provisions in Chile,
LSRL, Art. 2 (2); Bolivia, LSRL, Art. 3; Uruguay, LSRL, Art. 3 (2).
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associations in which there are foreigners to engage in certain types
of operations. These will be discussed later."'
Under most statutes, the interest of a partner in a Sociedad
de Responsabilidad Limitada must be of a certain minimum par value
(in Argentina"4 and Mexico," 100 pesos; in Venezuela," 1,000
bolivars) and if the par value is higher, it must be a multiple of the
minimum legal par value. 9'
The interest or part in a Sociedad de Responsabilidad Limitada
may not be represented by shares of stock"' and its conveyance is
subject to certain limitations. In Panama,99 Nicaragua,1" and Chile,"'
where the Sociedad de Responsabilidad Limitada is subject entirely or
partially to the rules of the Sociedad Colectiva (general partnership),
the unanimous consent of the partners is necessary in order to trans-
fer an interest or part in the association. This rule is also applied in
Mexico and Honduras, but in these countries it is possible to provide
in the contract of partnership that conveyances of parts or interests
in the association are subject only to the vote of a majority of part-
ners who represent at least three-fourths of the capital of the associa-
tion (Mexico) or by simple majority (Honduras).10 In Argentina,
if the number of partners is more than five, and in Colombia,
Uruguay, and Venezuela in any case, 03 the following principles are
applied: if the transferee is a partner no authorization is required,
but if the transferee is an outsider the authorization of a majority of
the partners, representing three-fourths of the capital of the associa-
tion, is required. A similar system is applied in Bolivia, but in this
country approval must be given by a majority of the votes of part-
ners representing 80% of the capital of the association." 4  Several
Latin American statutes have established pre-emptive rights on be-
half of the other partners."'
93See p. 198 infra.
94 LSRL, Art. 9.
95LGSM, Art. 62.
06 C.Co., Art. 316. Similar provisions are in force in Bolivia, LSRL, Art. 5 (100 bolivi-
anos); Honduras, C.Co., Art. 70 (100 lempiras); Uruguay, LSRL, Art. 8 (100 pesos).97 Argentina, LSRL, Art. 9; Bolivia, LSRL, Art. 5; Honduras, C.Co., Art. 70; Mexico,
LGSM, Art. 62; Venezuela, C.Co., Art. 316.
"Argentina, LSRL, Art. 9; Bolivia, LSRL, Art. 5; Colombia, LSRL, Art. 7; Honduras,
C.Co., Art. 66; Mexico, LGSM, Art. 58; Uruguay, LSRL, Art. 10(1).
9 C.Co., Art. 325.
'C.Co., Art. 169(3).
'o' C.Co., Art. 404(3).
12Mexico, LGSM, Art. 65; Honduras, C.Co., Arts. 89, 43.
103 Argentina, LSRL, Art. 12 (but if the Sociedad de Responsabilidad Limitada has no
more than five partners, then the unanimous consent of all of them is required); Colombia,
LSRL, Art. 7(2); Uruguay, LSRL, Art. 10(2); Venezuela, C.Co., Art. 317(b).
'04 Bolivia, LSRL, Art. 6.
"' Argentina, LSRL, Art. 12(2); Honduras, C.Co., Arts. 89 and 43(3); Mexico,
LGSM, Art. 66; Uruguay, LSRL, Art. 10(4); Venezuela, C.Co., Art. 317(a).
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Usually the conveyance of the interest of a partner in a Sociedad
de Responsabilidad Limitada requires the execution of an instrument
which must be recorded in the Register of Commerce."' The transac-
tion must also be recorded in a book of the association devoted to
that purpose.
The passing of the part or interest to the heirs of one of the part-
ners is subject to requirements similar to the ones just discussed, °7
but it is possible to avoid them by a clause in the articles of associa-
tion stating that the association will continue with the heirs of the
deceased, '° and in some countries, such as Colombia and Mexico, there
is a presumption that this was the intent of the partners, unless other-
wise provided for in the articles of association.' 0
G. Management
There are basic differences among the laws of the several Latin
American states in connection with the management of the Sociedad
de Responsabilidad Limitada, and the systems provided for by some
codes and statutes are incomplete and inadequate. Fortunately, com-
mercial customs have cured some of these deficiencies through the
general use of appropriate provisions in the contracts of association
regulating in detail the matter of administration. Finally, as a gen-
eral rule, the Latin American laws, to a greater or lesser extent, give
ample freedom to the partners in choosing and determining the de-
tails of the system of management.
Taking into account the general traits of the several legislative
schemes, the Latin American countries may be classified into three
groups, insofar as administration of the Sociedad de Responsabilidad
Limitada is concerned. However, it must be noted that among the
countries belonging to each one of the three groups, there are wide
divergencies. Those groups are:
(1) Countries which have provided, in a more or less detailed man-
ner, a special system of management for the Sociedad de Responsa-
bilidad Limitada: They are Argentina, Bolivia, Honduras, Mexico,
Uruguay, and Venezuela. It must be noted, however, that the Uru-
guayan law is quite incomplete and that it provides that in matters
not regulated by the law or by the contract of association, the
... Argentina, LSRL, Art. 12 (3); Colombia, LSRL, Art. 7 (2), but recording is necessary
only if there is a change in the management; Uruguay, LSRL, Art. 10 (1); Venezuela, C.Co.,
Art. 318.
107 Argentina, LSRL, Art. 12 (4).
108 Argentina, LSRL, Art. 12 (4).
... Colombia, LSRL, Art. 9; Mexico, LGSM, Art. 67. A similar effect may be given to
Art. 14 of the Uruguayan law.
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principles of the Sociedad Colectiva (general partnership) will be ap-
plied."'
(2) Countries which have not established a special system of
management for the Sociedad de Responsabilidad Limitada but have
merely provided that rules for the management of the Sociedades
Colectivas (general partnerships) are applicable to the Sociedad de
Responsabilidad Limitada. These are Chile, Colombia, Nicaragua,
and Panama.
(3) Finally, in Brazil, the statute contains a few provisions in re-
gard to liability of managers and other topics, but does not provide a
coherent and complete regulation for the management of the Soci-
edad de Responsabilidad Limitada.
The regulation by these three groups of countries will now be
examined in detail.
1. Countries Which Have a Special System of Administration
In the countries belonging to this group, the supreme authority of
the Sociedad de Responsabilidad Linitada is the meeting of partners.
This principle has been expressly embodied in the laws of Mexico1.
and Honduras"2 and it impliedly flows from several provisions of the
laws of other countries. '
As a general rule, the manner in which the meetings are to be
held is a matter left to the partners, who will provide the necessary
principles in the contract of association."' However, in several coun-
tries some limitations to this freedom of regulation have been imposed
by the laws. In Bolivia... and Uruguay 0 at least one meeting must
be held each year; in Honduras"" and Mexico"' the same rule has
been established but it is possible for the partners to provide in the
contract of association that certain action may be taken by mail.
However, in this latter case, a meeting must be held if it is so
decided by a certain majority."' Finally, it must be mentioned that
the laws of Mexico"'. and Honduras"'. provide that the annual meet-
"' Uruguay, LSRL, Art. 18.
"'. LGSM, Art. 77.
"2 C. Co., Art. 82.
113 See pp. 188-89 infra.
114 See, e.g., Argentina, LSRL, Art. 17. In this country the meetings of partners are not
mandatory, but merely optional. Venezuela, C.Co., Art. 330.
"' LSRL, Art. 13.
116 LSRL, Art. 12.
117 C.Co., Art. 83.
11 LGSM, Arts. 80 and 82.
".. In Mexico by partners representing 4 of the capital of the association (LGSM, Art.
82) and in Honduras by partners representing 1/3 of the capital (C.Co., Art. 83).
"o LGSM, Art. 80.
121 C.Co., Art. 83.
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ing of partners must be held in the domicile of the association.
a. Voting requirements.-In most of the countries no special quo-
rum is required by law for meetings of the partners. An exception to
this rule is found in the Code of Commerce of the Republic of Hon-
duras which provides that a quorum of partners representing one-
half of the capital of the Sociedad de Responsabilidad Limitada must
be present at the meetings. However, if this quorum is not obtained in
the first meeting, then a second meeting may be called and for this
meeting no quorum is required."'
As a general rule, in the countries belonging to this first group the
voting is determined in proportion to the amount of capital which
each partner holds in the association. In Argentina ' and Vene-
zuela"" a partner will have as many votes as parts or shares he has in
the Sociedad de Responsabilidad Limitada; in Bolivia each partner will
have a vote for each part that he had subscribed and paid for, but no
partner may represent more than 35 % of the total capital of the
association."' In Mexico each partner will have one vote for each
100 pesos, but "preferred interests with higher voting rights are al-
lowed.'. 2 Similar rules are applied in Honduras."'
There are substantial differences among the laws of the several
countries belonging to this group as to the majority which is needed
for the approval of motions or resolutions by the partners. In Argen-
tina2 and Venezuela... this point has been left to the discretion
of the partners, except in some respects that will be considered later.
In Venezuela the code of commerce also provides that if nothing is
said in the contract of association, the approval of ordinary resolutions
requires a majority of partners who represent at least one-half of
the capital of the association.'3° In Mexico ordinary resolutions must
be adopted by a majority of partners who represent at least one-half
of the capital of the association, but the contract of association may
require a higher majority. If a majority is not obtained in the first
casting then the decision may be adopted by a majority of the part-
ners, without taking into consideration what fraction of the capital
they represent."' In Honduras resolutions must be approved by a
122 C.Co., Art. 85.
13 LSRL, Art. 19.
14 C.Co., Art. 333.
125 LSRL, Art. 13.
12 LGSM, Art. 79.
".. One vote for every 100 lempiras (LSRL, Art. 86).
121 If nothing is provided for in the contract, ordinary motions will be approved by a
majority of votes. Halperin, Sociedades de Responsabilidad Limitada, pp. 218 ff. (1951).
'29 C.Co., Art. 330.
'o Art. 330.
' Mexico, LGSM, Art. 77.
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majority of votes and the voting power is determined in the propor-
tion of one vote for every 100 lempiras.'3 Finally, in Bolivia ordinary
resolutions are adopted by a majority of at least 50% of the capital.'33
As a result of the foregoing analysis it is apparent that voting
power is calculated in Honduras and Bolivia upon the basis of capital.
On the other hand, in Mexico and Venezuela it is determined both
upon the basis of capital and upon the basis of number of partners.
There are certain decisions which must be unanimously approved
by the partners. In Argentina, Bolivia, Mexico, and Honduras a
change of the object of exploitation or the imposition of additional
liability upon the partners must be unanimously adopted."4 In Vene-
zuela any modification of the contract of association which will im-
pose additional liability upon the partners must be also approved by
all the partners,'3 and in Argentina any amendment to the contract
of association must be approved by all partners when the number of
partners is not higher than five."
A special majority of votes is requred in all countries belonging
to this first group in order to modify the contract of association.
In Argentina, where the number of partners is more than five, a
quorum of partners representing three-fourths of the capital and
approval by partners representing one-half of the capital is neces-
sary;' M in Mexico the approval of a majority of partners representing
three-fourths of the capital is required;' 8 and in Honduras "' and
Venezuela "' the approval of three-fourths of the capital of the as-
sociation.
b. Powers of partnership ineetings.-As mentioned previously, the
meeting of partners is the supreme organ of the Sociedad de Respon-
sabilidad Limitada. The laws of Mexico.' and Honduras "' contain
detailed lists of the powers which the meeting of partners has. In
the other countries essentially the same authority is granted to it by
several articles expressed in the respective title, chapter, or statute.
The most important powers of the meeting of partners are: appoint-
ment and removal of managers and supervisors; power to amend the
132 C.Co., Arts. 86, 87.
'"2Bolivia, LSRL, Art. 13.
'24Argentina, LSRL, Art. 18; Bolivia, LSRL, Art. 16; Mexico, LGSM, Art. 83; Hon-
duras, C.Co., Art. 87.
'5 C.Co., Art. 332.
'36 LSRL, Art. 18.
137 C.Co., Art. 3 54, which is applicable to the Sociedad de Responsabilidad Limitada.
18s LGSM, Art. 83.
'31 C.Co., Art. 87.
'40 C.Co., Art. 332.
14' LGSM, Art. 78.
141 C.Co., Art. 82.
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contract of association and to impose additional liability upon the
partners; power to limit the authority of the managers through the
inclusion of appropriate provisions in the contract of association;
power to make effective the eventual liability of the managers and, in
some countries, to waive such liability; power to declare dividends;
and power to disapprove the conveyance of the interest of a partner
to a third person who is not a partner.
c. Managers.-A common characteristic of the laws of the coun-
tries belonging to the first group is a provision for the appointment
of a manager or managers who will have the administration of the
Sociedad de Responsabilidad Limitada. The appointment of managers
is mandatory in Argentina (with some qualifications),'1 Bolivia,14
Uruguay,"' and Venezuela,' 0 but it is optional in Mexico 4 and
Honduras,4 ' in the sense that if no managers are appointed in the
contract of association all the partners will manage the concern.
As a general rule, the managers may be partners or third persons,
and no specific prohibitions exist against foreigners being appointed
managers.
It is possible to appoint one or more managers and in this latter
case the contract will provide how their decisions must be made. The
law of Mexico14 and the Code of Commerce of Honduras"' provide
in this connection that decisions will be made by majority of votes
of the managers, unless the contract had established that they must
act unanimously.
The appointment of the manager or managers is accomplished by
the partners by majority vote, the requisite majority being deter-
mined by the general rules discussed above for ordinary motions.
However, in Argentina the number of votes of each partner will be
determined by dividing his interest in the association by the amount
of the interest of the partner who possesses the smaller part or share
in the association,"' and in Bolivia the unanimous consent of all the
partners is required if the candidate for the management is a third
person who is not a partner in the sociedad."'
... Argentina, LSRL, Art. 13. However, if the partners are five or less than five, I be-
lieve that it is not necessary to appoint managers. This is the position adopted by I Fer-
nindez, C6digo de Comercio Commentado, ed. cit., p. 440. However, a contrary view seems
to be found in 2 Soli-Aztiria, Sociedades de Responsabilidad Limitada 88.
'4"LSRL, Art. 9.
145LSRL, Arts. 5(4), 11.
'4s C.Co., Art. 322.
147 LGSM, Art. 74.
'4' C.Co., Art. 78.
14'LGSM, Art. 74.
'5o C.Co., Art. 78.
' LSRL, Art. 13 (2), C.Co., Art. 412.
152 LSRL, Art. 9.
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The general rule is that managers may be removed by the part-
ners at any time, with or without cause, in the same manner in which
they were appointed. In Venezuela, however, a special majority of
partners representing three-fourths of the capital of the association
is required."'
The manager or managers have all powers granted to them in the
contract of association. They may engage in any acts or transactions
which are in the ordinary course of business of the association, unless
their authority to do so was limited in the contract of association."4
As a general rule, these limitations are good against third persons
if the contract was properly recorded and published. However, even
in this case, the association may be liable for the acts of the managers
made in violation of limitations imposed in the contract under cer-
tain circumstances as, for instance, where the association has accepted
the benefits of the transaction."'
The laws of the countries now under consideration contain several
provisions concerning the liability of the managers. In Argentina,'56
Bolivia," 7 and Venezuela... the legislature has expressly provided that
it is unlawful for the managers to engage, directly or indirectly, in
the same type of business in which the association is engaged, without
securing appropriate permission from the partners. In Argentina.'
and Bolivia"' the managers are declared to be jointly liable in
case of illegal distribution of dividends. In Argentina.' and Vene-
zuela"' they are expressly subject to liability in case of violation
of their duties, the laws, or the contract of association, and in
these two countries, Mexico".3 and Honduras,"4 an action may be
directed against the managers for the "rebuilding" or "reintegration"
of the capital of the association when it has been improperly man-
aged.
The liability of the managers may be enforced by the association;"'
"a C.Co., Art. 323.
... See express formulations of this general rule in Argentina, LSRL, Art. 16 and Vene-
zuela, C.Co., Art. 325.
'1 The subject of the liability of commercial associations for transactions made by the
managers in excess of their powers is extremely complex and detailed. A close analysis of
this point is beyond the scope of this paper.
156 LSRL, Art. 14.
... LSRL, Art. 9.
'"C.Co., Art. 326.
' LSRL, Art. 21.
6'LSRL, Art. 9 (action to recover dividends illegally paid is subject to a short term
statute of limitations of 5 years).
"'. LSRL, Art. 14.
1" C.Co., Art. 324.
'63 LGSM, Art. 76.
164 C.Co., Arts. 80-81.
"'5Argentina, LSRL, Art. 15; Mexico, LGSM, Art. 76; Hondur2s, C.Co., Arts. 80-81.
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in Argentina, 66 Mexico, 67 and Honduras 6 it may also be enforced by
the partners in a derivative suit. In Venezuela derivative suits are
allowed when the claimants represent at least 10% of the capital
of the association. "9 In Argentina and Mexico the liability of the
managers may be waived by the partners by a vote of three-fourths
of the capital of the association.""
Creditors may also enforce the liability of the directors. This
right is unqualified in Honduras. In Argentina it may be exercised
only in case of liquidation or bankruptcy, and in Mexico, only in
this latter case by the trustee."
Finally, it must be added that managers will not be liable if
they did not know of the illegal motion, or if they voted against
it.'7 In Venezuela it is also required that in order to avoid liability,
notice of the illegal action must have been given to the supervisors.
2. Countries Having No Special System of Administration
The second group of countries, in so far as administration is con-
cerned, is composed of those whose laws do not provide a special
system of administration for the Sociedad de Responsabilidad Limit-
ada, but merely state that the rules of the Sociedad Colectiva (general
partnership) are applicable. These countries are Chile,7 4 Colombia,''
Nicaragua, 76 and Panama."
Under the system adopted by these four countries, each and every
one of the partners is a manager and has authority to act for and to
bind the association. 7  However, it is possible for the partners to
agree upon a different system of administration in the contract of
association.79  In particular they may give to one or more partners
the authority to represent the association,' 8' and may provide in the
166 LSRL, Art. 15.
"17 LGSM, Art. 76.
16 C.Co., Arts. 80-81.
669 C.Co., Art. 324.
'7Argentina, LSRL, Art. 15(2); Mexico, LGSM, Art. 76(2).
'' See articles cited note 165 supra.
1'1 See articles cited note 165 supra.
"s C.Co., Art. 324.
174 LSRL, Art. 4(2).
17' LSRL, Arts. 1, 11.
176 C.Co., Art. 137(2) (by implication).
177 C.Co., Art. 327(3) (by implication).
'71 Chile, C.Co., Arts. 371(2), 385, 386, 387; Colombia, LSRL, Art. 1; C.Co., Arts.
489(2), 510, 511, 512; Nicaragua, C.Co., Art. 138(2), 149, 150, 151; Panami, C.Co.,
Art. 302.
i7'Chile, C.Co., Arts. 371(1), 384; Colombia, C.Co., Arts. 489(1), 509; Nicaragua,
C.Co., Arts. 138(1), 148; Panami, C.Co., Art. 302.
's0Chile, C.Co., Art. 392; Colombia, C.Co., Art. 517; Nicaragua, C.Co., Art. 156;
Panami, C.Co., Art. 302.
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contract the system for adoption of motions by the partners-
managers. Also (and this is especially important) the partners may
delegate the management to third persons who are not partners."'
The system of delegating the administration of the Sociedad de
Responsabilidad Limitada to one or more managers is convenient and
in practice is the one used in Colombia."'1
3. Brazil
The Brazilian statute contains only a few articles in connection
with managers and their liability.183 It provides that the use of the
firm name may be delegated to one or more partners who will
manage the association, that the unauthorized or abusive use of the
firm name will give rise to civil and criminal liability, and that the
managers will be jointly and unlimitedly liable for violations of the
law, their authority, or the contract of association. Other aspects
of the management of the Sociedad de Responsabilidad Limitada are
not set forth in the special statute and therefore they must be reg-
ulated in the contract of association. If nothing is said in the con-
tract, then the rules of the Sociedad An6nima (corporation) are
applied.8 4
H. Supervision
As a general rule the Sociedades de Responsabilidad Limitada are
not subject to the supervision of the government, except in Uruguay
where the Ojlcina de Recaudaci6n de Impuestos a los Ganancias
Elevadas (Excess Profits Tax Collector's Office) has supervisory
powers over the Sociedades de Responsabilidad Limitada,"' and in
Colombia where the Sociedades de Responsabilidad Limitada are sub-
ject to the control and supervision of the Superintendencia de Socie-
dades Anonimas when 33 % or more of their capital is held by a
Sociedad An6nima (corporation).18
In all countries of Latin America, either by express provision of
the statutes or by application of general principles, the partners have
the right of direct supervision over the acts of the managers and,
generally speaking, over the running of the association. In Argen-
tina, Mexico, and Honduras the partners may also appoint one or more
supervisors (comisarios) for checking on the operations of the man-
181Chile, C.Co., Art. 385; Colombia, C.Co., Art. 510; Nicaragua, C.Co., Art. 149;
Panami, C.Co., Art. 315 (the unanimous consent of the partners is required).
18. Pinz6n, Sociedades, ed. cit., pp. 83 ff.
183 LSRL, Arts. 10-14.
184 LSRL, Art. 18.
'8LSRL, Art. 19; L. 11418 of April 29, 1950 and D. of Dec. 4, 1950.
188 D-L, 2831 of Nov. 8, 1952, Art. 1.
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agers.' s7 In Colombia, Chile, Nicaragua, and several other countries
there is no express provision authorizing the appointment of super-
visors. However, in at least one of these countries (Colombia) a
supervisor or a council of supervisors is customarily appointed for
the Sociedades de Responsabilidad Limitada of larger and medium
size.' In Venezuela, the system of supervision is obligatory if the
capital of the Sociedad de Responsabilidad Limitada is higher than
Bls 500,000;"0 in other cases, it is optional.
I. Dividensds and Reserve Funds
Most of the Latin American statutes do not contain any provision
concerning declaration and distribution of dividends and creation of
reserve funds. This deficiency greatly endangers the position of cre-
ditors to the extent that it permits distribution of dividends out of
funds other than earned surplus. In Argentina and Bolivia, on the
other hand, the statutes provide that dividends may be paid only out
of net earned surplus."' A similar rule may be inferred from the
words of article 85 of the Mexican LGSM which provides that dur-
ing the period in which the Sociedad de Responsabilidad Limitada is
being organized it is possible to give to the partners interest of up to
9% per annum on their investments in the association and that this
amount may be taken from funds other than earnings (beneficios).
This seems to imply that once the organization of the enterprise is
completed, dividends may be paid only out of earnings.
Insofar as reserve funds are concerned, the laws of Argentina,
Bolivia, and Uruguay require the creation of a reserve fund by devot-
ing to that purpose at least 5 % of the annual earnings. The amount
of the fund must be at least 10% of the capital of the association in
Argentina'9' and 50% in Uruguay. " ' The Brazilian law has not
established a limit.' s
. Argentina, LSRL, Art. 4(4), see also, 2 Soli-Aztiria, Sociedades de Responsabilidad
Limitada, No. 422 Mexico, LGSM, Art. 84; Honduras, C.Co., Art 88. In Bolivia this
system of supervision is expressly authorized when the partners are ten or more (LSRL, Art.
10).
' Pinz6n, Sociedades, ed. cit., p. 84.
's C.Co., Art. 327.
.. Argentina, LSRL, Art. 21. Dividends must be paid out of utilidades realizadas y
liquidas. Otherwise they may be recovered by creditors in an action against the partners,
subject to a 5 year statute of limitations. Bolivia, LSRL, Art. 10 (utilidades realizadas).
'9' LSRL, Art. 20.
190 LSRL, Art. 13.
193 LSRL, Art. 10(2).
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III. CORPORATIONS
A. Sources and Development'
The Latin American countries have followed in the field of cor-
porate law-as in many other fields-the principles, rules, and institu-
tions of the civil law jurisdictions of Continental Europe, particularly
those of France, Spain, and Italy, although some precepts and in-
stitutions of domestic origin may be found. The Anglo-American
influence is not considerable, but it has increased steadily during this
century. An example is the 1927 Law of Corporations of Panama
which was patterned on the Florida act on corporations then in
force.
The first corporations were created in France by royal charters
specially granted to companies engaged in maritime and colonial
enterprises. At this very early stage it is not possible to find a general
regulation of corporations. The liberal ideas of the Revolution
brought about the enactment by the National Convention of the
decret of March 2, 1791, the consequence of which, in the corporate
field, was to open the possibility for establishing corporations without
the need of a governmental grant. Unfortunately, no regulation was
then enacted, and, as a result, the newly acquired freedom was abused.
Against such abuses the French Convention reacted energetically by
abolishing the corporate form. The economic needs of the rising
capitalism and some basic philosophical principles demanded, how-
ever, the re-establishment of this form of business association. Thus,
it is not surprising that the Code of Commerce (1807) specifically
authorized the organization of Socidtds Anonymes (corporations).
Nevertheless, the drafters of the Code provided that an authorization
from the state was necessary. In this manner they tried to prevent the
same type of abuses that had been committed after the promulgation
of the decree of 1791. The need for a governmental grant in each case
made useless the establishment of a detailed regulation for corpora-
194 See general bibliography at beginning of Article. The English literature is not very
rich in the field of Latin American corporation law, but the following material may be
cited: Alyea, Subsidiary Corporations under the Civil and Common Law, 66 Harv. L. Rev.
1227 (1953); Barrancos y Vedia, Dealings between Directors and their Corporations in Ar-
gentinan and American Law, 5 Am. J. Comp. L. 497 (1956); Crawford, The 1940
Corporation Law of Brazil, 16 Tul. L. Rev. 228 (1942); Crawford, The Capital Structure
of Mexican Corporations, 28 Tul. L. Rev. 45 (1953); Crawford, Promoters Compensation-
Domestic and Foreign, 23 U. Cinc. L. Rev. 1 (1954); Eder, Company Law in Latin
America, 27 Notre Dame Law. 1-42, 223-43 (1951); Friedman (ed.), Legal Aspects of
Foreign Investments (1959) (elementary survey of the laws of various countries, including
several Latin American countries, in matters affecting private investments abroad); Inter-
American Bar Association, Special Report on the Corporation Laws of various Latin Ameri-
can countries applicable to foreign corporations and their subsidiaries in Inter-American Bar
Association, Ninth Conference Proceedings 163 9f. (1956).
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tions. This fact explains why only eight articles of the Code of Com-
merce (29 through 36) dealt specifically with the subject of corpora-
tions.
The system of ad hoc governmental authorization was somewhat
relaxed by the loi of May 23, 1863, and was finally abolished by the
loi of July 24, 1867. This last law regulated corporations in a detailed
manner, and although it has been the object of numerous amendments
and supplementations, particularly since World War I, it is still, the
basic act on this subject in France."' s
A development, similar to the one just referred to in France, took
place in the Iberian Peninsula. 9 '
As a general rule the codes of commerce enacted in the several
Latin American countries during the nineteenth century and
during the first quarter of the present century, many of which are
still in force, have great deficiencies so far as corporate regulation is
concerned. 97 A surprisingly limited number of articles are found
... See generally I Hamel-Lagarde, Trait6 de Droit Commercial, Nos. 516 ff. (1954).
196 The Code of 1829 allowed the creation of corporations by simple authorization of the
Commercial Tribunals, which, in practice, was given as a matter of course. This system
was changed by the Law of Jan. 28, 1848, establishing the requirement of governmental
authorization. Later the Decree of Oct. 28, 1868 softened to some extent the rigid system
set up by the Law of 1848, and the Law of Oct. 19, 1869 substituted for it a most liberal
system of incorporation. This same approach was taken by the Code of Commerce of 1885
which contained only 19 articles on the subject of corporations (151-169), thus leaving
most of the aspects of the regulation of corporate entities to the free will of the incorpora-
tors. After an unsuccessful attempt to modify this system, made in 1926, the Instituto de
Estudios Politicos proposed a preliminary draft of a new law of corporations, upon the
basis of which the Ministry of Justice prepared a final draft. This final draft became the
Law of July 17, 1951, which went into force on Jan. 1, 1952. (See, generally, 1 Garriguez-
Uria, Comentarios a la Ley de Sociedades An6nimas, Madrid, 1953, pp. 59 ff.).
" The following is an enumeration of the most important provisions on corporations in
force in the Latin American countries to which this paper relates: Argentina, C.Co., Arts.
313 ff.; Ley 8875 (Debentures); Regulatory Decree of the Inspeci6n General de Justicia
(April 27, 1923). About the history and evolution of the Argentina commercial laws in
general and of the corporate law in particular, see I Malagarriga, Tratado Elemental de
Derecho Comercial, Buenos Aires, 1951, pp. 399 ff.; 1 Garo, Derecho Comercial, Buenos
Aires, 1955, Nos. 38 ff. Brazil, The Code of Commerce regulated the field of corporations
in just five articles (295-299); later the Law of June 25, 1850 and the Decree No. 3257
of April 10, 1899 were enacted; finally, in 1940 the Decree-Law No. 2627 of Sept. 26,
1940 was promulgated. This decree is still in force and it contains the basic regulation of
corporations in 162 articles. After the enactment of the Decree 2627 other decrees and
laws have been passed on the subject of corporations, supplementing and modifying in mat-
ters of detail the system established by the original decree. The most important are: Decree-
Laws 2928 of Dec. 31, 1940; 3391 of July 7, 1941; 4480 of June 15, 1942; 5956 of Nov.
1, 1943; 6464 of May 2, 1944; 8563 of Jan. 5, 1946; 9783 of Sept. 6, 1946. Decrees 781 of
Sept. 12, 1938; 149-B of July 20, 1893; 22.456 of Feb. 10, 1933; 2784 of Nov. 20, 1940
and 7583 of May 25, 1945. On the matters of "debentures," the following enactments are
relevant: Law 5456 of Feb. 9, 1928; Decrees 177-A of Sept. 15, 1893; 781 of Oct. 12,
1938; 1392 of Sept. 26, 1939. Bolivia, C.Co., Arts. 225, 228, 247-252; Decrees of March
8, 1860; Dec. 26, 1873; Sept. 11, 1877; Law of Nov. 13, 1886; Decree of March 25, 1887;
Law of Oct. 13, 1892; Decrees of June 11, 1921; Jan. 28, 1922; Decree-Law of April 28,
1938 and Law of Sept. 27, 1904 (Insurance Companies). Chile, C.Co., Arts. 424 ff.; De-
creto con fuerza de Ley (Decree-Law) No. 251 of May 20, 1931; Law No. 6057 of July 16,
1937; Decree 3154 of July 23, 1947; Law No. 4657 of Sept. 25, 1929; Law No. 6156
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therein in connection with this important subject and many of the
rules set forth are now obsolete. These deficiencies of corporate law
have been cured in some jurisdictions to a certain extent through the
enactment of new codes of commerce, as in Honduras, through more
or less radical amendments to the old codes, through the enactment
of general laws on commercial associations, as in Mexico, through the
enactment of a corporation act, as in Brazil, or through the pro-
mulgation of numerous decrees and laws modifying the old system
and filling its gaps. It should be noted that this latter system has
created much confusion in some countries, where a vast number of
disparate statutes and decrees constituting a "piecemeal" regulation of
corporate law, have been passed but have not been collected or codi-
fied in an organic and complete manner. It is difficult in these coun-
tries to determine whether certain provisions have or have not been
overruled and thus to ascertain the applicable law.
In addition to the statutes and codes, custom and usage occupy an
outstanding position as sources of the law of corporations in Latin
America. Sometimes the gaps of the statutory law have been filled
by reference to custom and usage; for example, issuance of preferred
stock, although not expressly authorized by the written laws of sev-
eral countries, has become a common practice among corporations
of large size.
Other important sources of corporate law in Latin America are
the resolutions and regulations of the governmental bodies which
exercise state supervision over corporations. They must be consulted
in order to avoid the danger of forced dissolutions and liabilities.
The analysis here will be general and is intended to convey only
elementary and basic information about the principles most generally
of Jan. 13, 1938; Law 10363 of July 10, 1952; Law of Sept. 11, 1878 and Decree No. 4705
of Nov. 30, 1946. Colombia, C.Co., Arts. 550 ff.; Law 42 of 1898; Decree-Laws 2 and 37
of 1906; Law of 105 of 1927; Law 28 of 1931; Law 58 of 1931; Law 73 of 1935; Decrees
1273 of 1936; 2952 of 1936; Decree-Law 1403 of 1940; Law 66 of 1947; Decree 2521
of 1950 and Decree-Law 2831 of 1952. Ecuador, C.Co., Arts. 262 and 285 ff.; Law of
Oct. 15, 1909; Decree 230 of May 15, 1936; Decreto-Supremo (Supreme Decree) of
March 24, 1936; Executive Decree of Aug. 7, 1946; Decree-Law of July 23, 1957. Mexico,
LGSM, Arts. 87 ff.; Law on Investment Companies (published in the Diario Oficial of Dec.
31, 1955); New General Law on Credit Institutions (published in the Diario Oficial of
May 31, 1941); New Finance Institutions (published in the Diorio Oficial of Dec. 29,
1950); General Law of Insurance Institutions (published in the Diario Oficial of Aug. 31,
1955); New General Law on Credit Institutions (published in the Diario Oficial of May
31, 1941); New Law on Finance Institutions and the Reglamento de Inscripciones approved
by the Supreme Court on Dec. 17, 1936. Uruguay, C.Co., Arts. 403 ff.; Law 2230 of
June 2, 1893; Resolution of Dec. 17, 1946; Law 11.073 of June 24, 1949; Regulatory De-
crees of Oct. 20, 1948 and Nov. 26, 1949. There are many other laws and regulations con-
cerning corporations, collected by Tassina in Sociedades An6nimas, Montevidfo, 1948. Vene-
zuela, C.Co., Arts. 242 ff.; Laws of July 18, 1938 and Regulation of July 31, 1948.
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accepted and followed in this important field in Latin America. The
analysis is based primarily upon the laws and regulations of Argen-
tina, Brazil, Colombia, and Mexico, although frequent references will
be made to the laws of other South American jurisdictions. The
principles set forth are subject to many qualifications and exceptions
in connection with each particular country. The Latin American laws
present fundamental differences and especially so in this field, which
has been so deeply modified by original statutes enacted after the
adoption of the codes of commerce. It must be pointed out
that in the course of this century special statutes have been enacted
in the several Latin American countries regulating in detail the organ-
ization and operation of certain types of corporations, such as banks
and insurance companies. These special statutes will not be con-
sidered in this paper.
B. Act of Incorporation
Traditionally, the act of incorporation has been regarded in the
civil law jurisdictions as a contract between the incorporators. '98 The
Spanish term for the act of incorporation (i.e., articles of incorpora-
tion) clearly discloses this fact. That term is contrato de sociedad,
literally translated, "contract of association or incorporation." In
modern times the contractual view has been the object of severe
criticism by several outstanding writers who are of the opinion that
a corporation is simply a legal institution and not a contract. This
new approach is generally referred to as the "doctrine or theory of
the institution." But even today a majority of the legal writers
believe that the act of incorporation (by articles of incorporation) is
a contract, although they do not disregard the fact that as a result of
this contract a juristic person arises and with it a vast number of
juridical relationships. ' The act of incorporation is said to be a
peculiar type of contract, a "plurilateral contract," according to
Ascarelli's terminology.0 0 From a practical standpoint the fact that
the act of incorporation is not an ordinary contract but a pluritateral
contract gives rise to many important consequences. Thus, for ex-
ample, if the act of incorporation is void or voidable in regard to
any one of the incorporators, the whole contract will not necessarily
fail; it will remain binding as to the other incorporators.
" Similarly, the act which creates an association is regarded as a contract between the
partners.
.. See generally, I Hamel-Lagarde, TraitS, ed. cit., Nos. 383 ff.
.. Ascarelli, Saggi de Diritto Commerciale, Milano, 1955, pp. 130 ff. and 325 ff.
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C. Incorporators
In several Latin America countries, such as Bolivia, Chile, Ecuador,
Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela, the number of incorporators may be
two or more. This requirement is derived from the general principles
of commercial associations and applies in the absence of any specific
norms requiring a higher number of incorporators."°' On the other
hand, the codes or statutes of the following countries, among others,
require a higher number of incorporators: Argentina, 10; Brazil, 7;
Colombia, 5; and Mexico, 5202
In Brazil, Mexico, and some other countries the number of share-
holders may not be lower than the minimum number of incorporators
during the life of the corporation; otherwise, the corporation is dis-
solved.0 3 In Chile and Colombia, the corporation is dissolved only
if all the shares become the property of one person °4 In some other
countries, such as Peru and Uruguay, the codes do not contain any
express provision on this point, and thus the question is controversial
and doubtful.2 5  On the other hand, the Venezuelan Code of Com-
merce expressly provides that a corporation shall not be dissolved even
201though all the shares come into the hands of one person.
As a result of the preceding analysis it may be concluded that "one
man" or "solely owned" corporations are as a general rule prohibited
in Latin America.
The incorporators may be natural or juristic persons. Therefore,
other corporations, partnerships, or official entities may become in-
corporators and shareholders.
As a general rule the incorporators need not be nationals of the
particular country. However, it is important to observe that in
Mexico certain kinds of corporations must have only Mexican share-
holders, for example, corporations engaged in the exploitation of
oil °2 or in the operation of commercial radio stations. Also, in Chile
there are certain types of corporations in which no more than 40%
of the shares may be owned by foreigners.00
20' Romero, Las Compaflias de Comercio en el Ecuador 203 (1959) (Ecuador); 2 Mez-
zera, Curso de Derecho Comercial, 243 (1952) (Uruguay).
202Argentina, C.Co., Art. 318 (1st); Brazil, D-L 2627, Art. 38(1); Colombia, Law
58 (1931), Art. 43; Mexico, LGSM, Art. 89(1).
20 Brazil, D-L 2627, Art. 137(d); Mexico, LGSM, Art. 229(IV).
204 Chile, D-L 251 (May 20, 1931), Art. 92; Columbia, Decree 2521 (1950), Art.
187 (3rd).
200 Mezzera, op. cit. supra note 201, at 243. However, in Uruguay, Art. 2 of the Law
2.230 (June 2, 1893) seems to imply that a corporation will not be dissolved even though
all its shares become the property of one person.
206 C.Co., Art. 341.
20. Law of Petroleum (Dec. 16, 1941), Art. 10 and Regulation of May 2, 1941.
20SD-L 251 (May 20, 1931), Art. 118.
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D. Capital Requirements for Incorporation
A minority of the Latin American countries require a minimum
stated or authorized capital as a condition precedent for incorpora-
tion. Mexico, for example, requires a stated capital of at least 25,000
pesos (approximately $2,000).' 09 On the other hand, no minimum
stated capital is required by the laws of Argentina, Bolivia, Chile,
Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela.
Some countries, such as Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, Mexico, Peru, and
Venezuela, demand the full subscription of all the stated capital as a
requirement for incorporation." ' This is, perhaps, the general rule
in the civil law jurisdictions. However, the laws of some other
Latin American countries require only the subscription of a part of
the stated capital; Argentina and Uruguay, for instance, require the
subscription of 20% of the stated capital." '
Substantially all the laws of the Latin American countries provide
that a certain minimum percentage of the subscribed capital must
be paid before incorporation. Argentina requires the payment of
10 % of the subscribed capital; Brazil, 10% of the par value of each
share of stock; Colombia and Venezuela, the payment of 1/5 of each
subscribed share. Furthermore, in Argentina and Brazil at
least 10% of the subscribed capital must have been paid in cash and
deposited in a national or state bank. 12
Perhaps a majority of the Latin American codes and statutes pro-
vide that if the actual capital of a corporation goes below a certain
limit the corporation must be dissolved. This minimum limit is a
question diversely regulated in the several countries.
As a general rule the stated capital may be increased or decreased
during the life of a corporation by means of an amendment to the
200 LGSM, Art. 89(2).
219Brazil, D-L 2627, Art. 38(1); Chile, D-L 251 (May 20, 1931), Art. 89; Ecuador,
C.Co., Art. 294; Mexico, LGSM, Art. 89(2); Peru, C.Co., Art. 159 (by implication);
Venezuela, C.Co., Art. 249.
251 Argentina, C.Co., Art. 318 (2); Uruguay, Law 2.230 (June 2, 1893), Art. 3.
"'aArgentina, C.Co., Art. 318(3); Brazil, D-L 2627, Art. 38(2); Colombia, Law 58
(1931), Art. 34 and Decree 2521 (1950), Art. 14. In Colombia, however, paying in of
the minimum capital is not a requirement for a valid incorporation. If 1/5 of the sub-
scribed shares is not paid the only consequence is that the Superintendencia may impose
fines. Venezuela, C.Co., Art. 249; Uruguay (25%) Law 2230 (June 2, 1893), Art. 3.
In Mexico it is necessary to pay at least 20% of the shares payable in cash and it is re-
quired to pay the entire value of those payable otherwise than in cash (LGSM, Art. 89
(II)). In Bolivia the minimum paid in capital is determined in each concrete case by the
executive power in the decree authorizing the final organization of a corporation, but the
maximum may not exceed 20% of the stated capital (Decree of March 8, 1860, Art.
1176). Apparently a similar rule is applied in Chile, although in this country no maximum
paid-in captial has been established by the laws (see, D-L 251 of May 22, 1931, Art. 89).
Finally, in Peru,, Art. 159 of the Code of Commerce authorizes the partial payment of
the capital but without determining a minimum limit.
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bylaws which must comply with certain substantive and formal
requirements."3 In the case of capital reduction, the laws of several
countries (Brazil, for example) contain several provisions for the
protection of creditors, such as the requirement that the corporation
notify them of the prospective action, and their right, under certain
circumstances, to oppose it.2"' Insofar as increase of capital is con-
cerned, it must be pointed out that the dissenting shareholders are
granted a right of appraisal in Venezuela, Uruguay, and some other
countries. In pursuance of this right they may leave the corporation
and demand the payment by the corporation of the price of their
shares in accordance with the figures contained in the last balance
sheet.21 In Colombia there is a highly restrictive provision prohibit-
ing the diminution of the capital of a corporation, which in practice
makes it necessary for a corporation that wants to decrease its capital
to dissolve and reorganize with a lower capital.21
In Mexico and some other countries the law authorizes so-called
"variable capital" corporations. The "variable capital" corporations
are those in which only a minimum capital, lower than the stated
capital, must be subscribed. The balance will be issued in redeem-
able stock or in stock subject to amortization. By means of this
device and without the need to amend the bylaws a corporation may
increase its capital by the sale of unsubscribed shares, or reduce it
by redeeming or amortizing stock. It is important to observe, how-
ever, that for the security of creditors the law provides that shares
representing the minimum capital are not redeemable and are
not subject to amortization.
E. "Successive" and "Instantaneous" Incorporation
Under the most advanced civil law statutes on this subject, there
are two types of incorporation procedure:
(1) "Successive," i.e., by "public subscription," and
(2) "Instantaneous," i.e., by "private subscription."
1. Successive Incorporation
The successive type of incorporation makes it possible for the
promoters to offer the shares of the prospective corporation to the
213Brazil, D-L 2627, Arts. 78(d), 108-115; 1 Ferreira, Instituicoes de Direito Com-
mercial §§71-74 and 76 (1951) (creditors may not oppose reduction of capital due to
lower value of assets); Chile, D-L 251 (May 22, 1931), Art. 96 (requires authorization
from the state); Ecuador, Romero, op. cit. supra note 201, at 207; Mexico, LGSM, Arts.
9, 82(111), 115, 132, 133, 130, 260-264, Peru, C.Co., Arts. 172, 175; Venezuela, C.Co.
Arts. 222, 264, 280, 282.
214 Authorities cited note 213 supra.
" Uruguay, Law 3545 (July 19, 1909), Art. 1; Venezuela, C.Co., Art. 282.
211 C.Co., Art. 568.
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public for subscription before final incorporation. The promoters
must comply with certain formal requirements, such as the draft-
ing and publication of a prospectus in accordance with which
the public subscription of the shares must be conducted. Once
the capital has been subscribed, a meeting of "subscribers" is called,
and in this or in subsequent meetings final incorporation is accom-
plished and the bylaws of the corporation are discussed and ap-
proved.
A majority of the civil law countries and several Latin American
nations, such as Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, and Venezuela, expressly
authorize and regulate the "successive" type of incorporation.217 This
type of incorporation appears to be impliedly authorized by the laws
of Chile, Ecuador, and Uruguay."8 On the other hand, it is not
authorized in several other countries such as Colombia, although
many outstanding legal writers have advocated its adoption.""
The successive type of incorporation is particularly useful in those
countries which require the full subscription of the stated capital for
the organization of enterprises which need large amounts of capital
to begin business. However it is believed that the "succesive" type of
incorporation is not really necessary in those countries which do not
require the subscription of the entire capital of the corporation. This
opinion is backed by the experience of Argentina. Although Argen-
tina accepts the "successive" type of incorporation, this system has
very seldom been used in practice, because only 20% of the author-
ized capital need be subscribed, and thus it is unnecessary to appeal
to the complicated system of successive incorporation."'0
2. Instantaneous Incorporation
The "instantaneous" system of incorporation is accepted by all
Latin American countries either as the only system of incorporation
or as an alternative system to that of successive incorporation and
it is the one more commonly used in practice.
Although there are many differences in detail among the several
countries in connection with the system of "instantaneous" incor-
poration, the following are the steps which it usually implies:
a. Articles of incorporation and bylaws.-First is the drafting by
the incorporators of the articles of incorporation and the bylaws.
.. Argentina, C.Co., Arts. 320 ff.; Brazil, D-L 2627 (1940), Arts. 40 ff.; Mexico,
LGSM, Arts. 91-101; Venezuela, C.Co., Arts. 248-258.
.. Ecuador, C.Co., Arts. 297-299 and Romero, op. cit. supra note 201, at 202; Chile,
D-L 251 (May 22, 1931), Art. 90; Uruguay, Mezzera, op. cit. supra note 201, at 250.
219 Pinz6n, La Sociedad An6nima, pp. 96 ff.
220 Castillo, Curso de Derecho Comercial 246 (1951).
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Although the codes and the statutes, as well as many authors and
practicing attorneys, make a distinction between articles of incor-
poration and bylaws, this distinction is in most countries more
theoretical than practical. As a matter of practice the best system in
most jurisdictions is to combine in a single document the articles of
incorporation and the bylaws. Thus the complete document of
incorporation will contain:..'
(1) The names of the incorporators, their profession, nationality,
domicile, and age.
(2) The formal manifestation by the incorporators of their intent
to create a corporation.
(3) The bylaws of the corporation, which must state:
(a) name, nationality, and duration of the corporation.
(b) purpose.
(c) amount of the stated capital.
(d) number of shares, their nature, and the rights that they
grant to the shareholders.
(e) system of administration and supervision.
(f) rules as to balance sheets and income statements, reserve
funds and dividends.
(g) rules as to dissolution and liquidation.
(h) system for amending the bylaws.
(4) A statement setting out: what part of the capital was sub-
scribed and the manner in which the subscription was made,
including the names of subscribers and the amounts sub-
scribed by each one of them; the amounts actually paid in
compliance with the subscription agreement with a statement
as to whether said payments were made in cash or in kind,
and the manner in which the balance is to be paid. Also, in
some countries, a statement that a certain percentage of the
capital was paid in cash and deposited in a bank is required.
(5) The appointment of the first board of directors and of the
first supervisor or supervisors.
(6) The granting of authority to one of the directors to obtain
the authorization from the government for the organization
or operation of the corporation, in those jurisdictions in which
such authorization is required.
Not all of the statements that the bylaws must contain, if omitted,
221 See generally, Argentina, C.Co., Arts. 291, 292, 318; Bolivia, Decree of March 8,
1860, Art. 1172; Brazil, D-L 2627, Art. 45; Chile, C.Co., Art. 426; Colombia, C.Co., Art.
552 and Decree 2521 (1950), Art. 9; Mexico, LGSM, Art. 6; Peru, C.Co., Arts. 159, 160;
Uruguay, C.Co., Arts. 395 and 406; Venezuela, C.Co., Art. 213.
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would nullify the act of incorporation. For instance, if no system
of administration is provided for in the bylaws, the corporation
nevertheless will be a de jure corporation and its system of adminis-
tration will be the one provided for in the codes or statutes for those
cases in which the bylaws are silent in this connection. On the other
hand, it is essential to state either the period of time for which the
corporation is created or a concrete and specific purpose which, once
it is achieved, will determine the end of the corporation. This rule is
a consequence of the fact that most Latin American countries do not
allow the establishment of corporations for an unlimited period of
time."
In several Latin American countries the instrument of incorpora-
tion must be a notarial document, i.e., a document passed before a
Notary Public, the original of which is kept in the office of the
Notary Public for inspection by any interested person. This is the
rule in Argentina, Bolvia, Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, and
Peru.22' In some other countries such as Uruguay and Venezuela, the
document may be a private or a notarial instrument, at the election
of the incorporators."4
b. Recordation and publication.-An abstract of the most impor-
tant provisions contained in the document of incorporation and in
the bylaws must be recorded in the Public Register of Commerce,
which is kept by the Chambers of Commerce or by the Commercial
Courts. If the corporation is planning to do business in different
territories, the recording must be made in the Chambers of Com-
merce or the Commercial Courts of all the territories involved. 25
The abstract of the articles and bylaws must be published in a
newspaper-usually in the official newspaper-within a certain period
of time after their formal execution (generally within 15 or 30
days) .22
c. Necessity for obtaining state approval.-In several Latin Amer-
ican nations such as Brazil and Peru, the general rule is that the
222 See in this connection Argentina, C.Co., Art. 318(4); Chile, C.Co., Art. 431; Co-
lombia, Decree 2521 (1950), Art. 9(6); Uruguay, C.Co., Arts. 405 and 407.
223 Argentina, C.Co., Art. 289; Bolivia, Decree of March 8, 1860, Art. 1172; Brazil, D-L
2627, Art. 45; Colombia, C.Co., Art. 465, Decree 2521 (1950), Art. 7; Ecuador, C.Co.,
Art. 337; Mexico, LGSM, Art. 5; Peru, C.Co., Art. 127.
224 Uruguay, C.Co., Art. 393; Venezuela, C.Co., Art. 211.
22' As to recording, see generally Argentina, C.Co., Arts. 293, 294, 319; Brazil, D-L
2627, Arts. 50-52; Chile, C.Co., Arts. 440 and 354; Colombia, Decree 2521 (1950), Arts.
10 and 11; Ecuador, C.Co., Arts. 338, 339; Mexico, LGSM, Arts. 260-262; Peru, C.Co.,
Arts. 7, 127; Uruguay, C.Co., Arts. 47, 397, 398, 407; Venezuela, C.Co., Arts. 215(2)
and 216.
226Argentina, C.Co., Art. 319 and Decree of Feb. 1, 1917; Brazil, D-L 2627, Art. 54;
Chile, C.Co., Art. 440; Colombia, Decree 2521 (1950), Art. 11; Ecuador, C.Co., Arts.
338-340; Uruguay, C.Co., Art. 407; Venezuela, C.Co., Art. 212.
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state does not intervene in the organization of corporations. There-
fore, it is not necessary to obtain any grant or authorization from
the government in order to establish a corporation. It must be
observed, however, that there are certain specific types of corpora-
tions which require an authorization from the government in these
countries. This is the case with regard to banks, insurance institu-
tions, and savings institutions in Peru, and with regard to foreign
corporations in Brazil."7
In Ecuador, Mexico, Venezuela, and some other jurisdictions the
document of incorporation must be presented to the Court of Com-
merce before recording. The judge will analyze the instrument and,
if he finds that it is in accordance with the law, he will order its
recording.2" This act is essentially ministerial and although it may
be considered as an act of state supervision, it may not be regarded as
a discretionary grant from the state.
A somewhat similar situation exists in Colombia where it is neces-
sary to secure the authorization of the Superintendencia de Sociedades
An6nimas before starting to do business." The Superintendencia,
before granting the authorization, will analyze the document of in-
corporation in order to determine whether it conforms to law, and
if the result of this inquiry is satisfactory, it will issue the permit.
The Supreme Court of Colombia has decided that this permit is not
essential for the existence of a corporaton.2"' However, if it is not
obtained before doing business, the corporation may be subject to
fines"' and perhaps it may even be dissolved.
In Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Uruguay,232 and some other jurisdic-
tions, the existence of a corporation depends upon an act of the
state, in which the executive power grants an authorization for the
establishment of each particular corporation. Generally speaking, in
these countries the executive power may grant or deny the authoriza-
tion, taking into account not only whether the document of incor-
poration was duly executed and conforms to law but also whether
the establishment of the corporation is beneficial for the common
welfare. This act is truly discretionary, because if the authoriza-
227 Boesen, Rights and Duties of Foreign Business under Peruvian Law 215 (Lima 1953).
22. Ecuador, C.Co., Art. 289; Mexico, LGSM, Arts. 260-262; Venezuela, C.Co., Art.
215(2).
29Law 58 (1931), Art. 9 and Decree 2521 (1950), Arts. 15, 16, 19.
20 Corte Suprema de Justicia, Agosto 12 de 1948, Gaceta Judicial No. 2064.
211 See Pinz6n, La Sociedad An6nima, pp. 99 ff.
22 Argentina, C.Co., Art. 318, and Regulatory Decree of the General Inspection of
Justice (Inspeci6n General de Justicia) of April 27, 1923; Bolivia, Decree of March 8,
1860, Art. 1174; Chile, C.Co., Art. 427 and related provisions, particularly those contained
in the D-L 251 of May 20, 1931; Uruguay, C.Co., Art. 405, Decree of May 15, 1949 and
Resolution of Dec. 2, 1948.
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tion is denied on the basis that the establishment of the corporation
is contrary to the common welfare, the denial is not subject to judicial
review. In practice, however, the government will always grant the
authorization if the act of incorporation is not contrary to law.
The procedure for obtaining a grant from the state is extremely
formalistic and full of minor details, and may take several months.
Such is the case particularly in Chile where the government must
issue two decrees, the decree of "authorization of existence" (decreto
de autorizaci6n de existencia) and the decree of "installation" (decre-
to de Instalaci6n)."'
Noncompliance with the formal requirements for incorporation
may render the incorporators or the directors and executive officers
of the corporation, or both, personally liable for damages caused to
third persons. 34
F. Shares of Stock
1. In General
In several countries, e.g., Bolivia, Ecuador, and Uruguay, the statu-
tory regulation of shares of stock is deficient, not only in the sense
that there are only a very limited number of provisions pertaining
to shares, but also in the sense that the system lacks flexibility and
appears obsolete for modern economic life. Fortunately some of
these deficiencies have been remedied, at least in part, by way of
customs and usages. In Brazil, Mexico, and several other Latin
American countries, on the other hand, the statutory regulation of
shares of stock is highly advanced and complete.
Generally speaking, the Latin American codes and statutes start
the treatment of this important subject by providing that the capital
of corporations shall be divided into shares of stock of an equal value.
Although in several of the civil law jurisdictions shares of stock must
be of a minimum par value, this principle has not been adopted
in Latin America where shares of stock may be of any par value.
2. Subscription and Payment of Shares
A subscription for shares made prior to or after incorporaton is
binding upon the subscribers and upon the corporation."' The Latin
233See generally 2 Olavarria, Manual de Derecho Comercial 142 ff. (1950).
24 Argentina, C.Co., Arts. 228, 304; Bolivia, Decree of March 8, 1860, Art. 1180;
Chile, C.Co., Art. 441; Colombia, Decree 2521 (1950), Art. 21(2); Ecuador, C.Co., Arts.
301, 321, 344; Peru, C.Co., Art. 128; Uruguay, C.Co., Art. 424; Venezuela, C.Co., Art.
219.21 See an exhaustive discussion of the basis upon which this liability has been rationalized
in 1 Hamel-Lagarde, Trait6, ed. cit., Nos. 587 if.
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American statutes usually afford a corporation the following elective
remedies in case of failure by the subscribers to perform their obliga-
tions to subscribe: 36
(1) a suit for specific performance for the collection of the
amounts due under the subscription agreement;
(2) the right to sell the shares of the defaulting subscriber (this
sale, under most statutes, must be made in the stock market
or at public auction) ;
(3) if the shares may not be sold, declaration of them as void
with retention of the installments already paid by the de-
faulting subscriber; and
(4) such other remedies as may be set forth in the bylaws of
the corporation. Additionally, the Brazilian law provides that
the bylaws may impose a fine of no more than 5 % of the
amount due in case of nonpayment of the amount due in
accordance with the subscription agreement. 37
Diverse types of consideration may be given in exchange for shares
of stock. It may be cash, tangible or intangible property, chattels, or
realty. Goodwill, a patent, machinery, buildings, and in some coun-
tries, even labor to be performed in the future are good consideration.
Taking into account the nature of the consideration given in pay-
ment for the stock, shares may be classified in two groups:
(1) shares paid in cash; and
(2) shares paid in tangible or intangible property other than cash.
In connection with this second type of stock it is important to
make several observations.
If the consideration is a note, a bill of exchange, or other document
of credit made by the subscriber or endorsed by him to the corpora-
tion, some Latin American statutes, such as the Colombian law,
provide that the payment will not be regarded as completed until
the instrument is actually paid to the corporation."' The statutes of
several countries provide that if the consideration given for the
shares is other than cash, the price of the shares must be entirely
paid. 39
In order to avoid fraud to the creditors and to the shareholders,
the Latin American statutes contain strict and severe standards for
3. Although there are some differences between the several countries, this is the
scheme of remedies usually afforded. Argentina, C.Co., Art. 333; Brazil, D-L 2627, Arts.
74-76; Bolivia, Decree of March 8, 1860, Art. 1186; Chile, C.Co., Art. 440; Colombia, De-
cree 2521 (1950), Art. 76; Ecuador, C.Co., Art. 30; Mexico, LGSM, Arts. 118-121; Peru,
C.Co., Arts. 171, 178; Venezuela, C.Co., Arts. 209, 252 and 295.
237 Brazil, D-L 2627 (1940), Art. 76 (§ 2).
211 C.Co., Arts. 497-499, 569.
...See, e.g., Mexico, LGSM, Art. 89(2).
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the appraisal of property given in payment for shares of stock. The
LGSM of Mexico demands that the shares of stock paid other than
in cash remain deposited with the corporation for two years. If
within this period the value of the property falls 25 % or more
below the stated value, then the shareholder will be obligated to
cover the deficiency. 40 In Colombia the appraisal of property given
in payment for shares must be approved by all the subscribers if
given prior to incorporation or by at least 75 % of the votes of the
shareholders present at the meeting if given after incorporation. In
both instances the appraisal must be also approved by the govern-
mental body charged with the supervision of corporations (Super-
intendencia Nacional de Sociedades An6nimas)."4'
In accordance with the better view, either full title (fee simple) to
property or a limited right of use and enjoyment of the same, may
be given in exchange for shares of stock. If it is not expressly stated
whether full title or only a limited right was conveyed, the presump-
tion is that full title (fee simple) was transferred to the association. 4 '
3. "Capital" and "Labor" Shares
Shares paid in cash or in property are known as "capital" shares.
In addition to "capital" shares, several Latin American countries
recognize the so-called "labor" or "industry" shares (acciones de
trabajo o industria). In Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, and several other
countries "labor" shares are those issued for services to be rendered
in the future. Labor shares must all belong to a special series; the
certificates crediting them may not be issued until the services that
were promised have been fully performed. They do not grant any
right to the assets of the corporation but only to the dividends. 43
The Mexican statute also authorizes a type of "shares" known as
"labor" or "industry" shares. 44 These are "shares" that a corporation
may issue to its employees as an incentive to greater interest and
attention to the progress of the business of the particular concern.
They are not really issued in exchange for future services, but
represent a bonus intended to allow participation of the workers in
the profits of the corporation.
240 LGSM, Art. 141. In Chile, shares paid other than in cash may not be negotiated for
a period of two years from the date of their issuance (D-L 251, May 20, 1931, Art. 95).
141 Decree 2521 (1950), Arts. 33 ff. and L. 66 (1847), Art. 40. See, also, Chile, C.Co.,
Art. 443; Ecuador, C.Co., Art. 299; Venezuela, C.Co., Art. 256(1).
M This is a general principle of the law of associations, applicable to all kinds of business
associations.
a4aBolivia, Decree of March 8, 1860, Arts. 1182-1183 (until the services have been
fully rendered, shares of stock shall not be delivered to the stockholders); Chile, C.Co.,
Arts. 446-447; Columbia, C.Co., Arts. 493, 572-73.
244 LGSM, Art. 114.
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Finally, it must be noted that in Uruguay and in some other
countries, labor to be done in the future is not good consideration
for the issuance of shares of stock."'
4. Shares Not Fully Paid
In Latin America, share certificates may be issued even though the
subscriber has not yet paid for the share or shares fully, but in this
case the certificates must always be nominative, " except in Peru
where bearer certificates may be issued if at least 50% of the value
of the shares was paid."' According to some statutes the amounts
already paid and the amounts due must appear on the face of the
instrument,4" and in Colombia and other countries, only provisional
certificates may be issued, and the word "provisional" must clearly
appear on the face of the instrument in order to put on inquiry
third persons who may want to acquire the shares.
Generally speaking, shares which have not been fully paid may
be negotiated. However, the Brazilian statute allows the negotiation
of shares not fully paid only after at least 30% of the par value has
been paid, and in Ecuador the negotiation of shares not fully paid is
possible only after payment of Y of their value." 9
In most countries the subscriber who has transferred stock not
fully paid is jointly liable with the future transferees for the balance
of the stock price. '
In Mexico, shares which have not been fully paid give to their
owners merely a limited right to dividends, proportional to the
amount actually paid."2 This is not, however, the universal rule.
Generally speaking, the holders of shares partially paid are entitled
to full dividends.
22
G. Certificates of Stock
Technically speaking, in Latin America as in the United States,
241 Mezzera, op. cit. supra note 201, at 265.
246 Argentina, C.Co., Art. 327(2); Bolivia, Decree of March 8, 1860, Art. 1188; Brazil,
D-L 2627, Art. 23(1); Chile, Decree 4705, Art. 36; Colombia, Law 58 (1931), Art. 34;
Ecuador, C.Co., Art. 296; Mexico, LGSM, Art. 117; Uruguay, C.Co., Art. 412; Venezuela,
C.Co., Art. 294.
247 C.Co., Art. 171.
24 See, e.g., Argentina, C.Co., Art. 328(3).
249Brazil, D-L 2627, Art. 14; Ecuador, C.Co., Art. 318.
2. Argentina, C.Co., Art. 332; Brazil, D-L 2627 (1940), Art. 75; Bolivia, C.Co., Art.
252 and Decree of March 8, 1860, Art. 1185; Chile, Law of Sept. 6, 1878; Ecuador, C.Co.,
Art. 319; Colombia, C.Co., Art. 577; Peru, C.Co., Art. 171; Uruguay, C.Co., Art. 415;
Venezuela, C.Co., Art. 294; Mexico, LGSM, Art. 117(3).
2" LGSM, Art. 117(2).
222 See a discussion of this point in Pinz6n, La Sociedad An6nima 110.
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shares of stock must be distinguished from the certificates of stock
which are the instruments issued evidencing the existence of the shares
and the extent of the rights the shares embody. These certificates
of stock are subject, for most purposes, to the principles and rules
controlling negotiable instruments, and they must contain the in-
formation and clauses provided for in the codes and statutes." 3
Contrary to American rule, it is possible in Latin America to issue
stock certificates to bearer, although with some limitations. Thus, for
instance, in most countries the issuance of bearer certificates is not
permitted unless and until the shares have been fully paid."' Also,
it is not possible to issue bearer certificates in those corporations
whose shareholders, in whole or in part, must be nationals of the
particular country. ss
The negotiation of bearer certificates is effected by the delivery
(tradici6n) of the documents.25
In practice most of the share certificates are not bearer but are
nominative, i.e., issued to a particular person whose name appears on
the face of the instrument. The conveyance of nominative certificates
must be made by recording the transaction in a special book kept
by the corporation known as the register of shareholders.25 Prior to
the recording of the conveyance the new owner will be considered as
such as against his transferor, but not as against the corporation or
third persons. Thus, in so far as the corporation is concerned, the
shareholders are only those whose names appear in the record of
shareholders.
H. Non-Par Stock and Preferred Stock
Generally speaking, the Latin American laws do not authorize the
issuance of stock without par value. An exception to this rule is
found in the Mexican General Law of Commercial Associations and
253 As to statements that stock certificates must contain, cf. Argentina, C.Co., Art. 328;
Brazil, Decree 2627 (1940), Art. 20; Chile, Decree 4705, Art. 33; Venezuela, C.Co., Art.
293.254 Cf. authorities cited note 246 supra.
... I Rodriguez, Sociedades, ed. cit., 369 ff. (Mexico); Brazil, D-L 2627 (1940), Art. 60.
256Argentina, C.Co., Art. 330 (a contrario); Bolivia, Decree of March 8, 1860, Art.
1187; Brazil, D-L 2627 (1940), Art. 27(6); Chile, C.Co., Art. 451; Colombia, Decree
2521 (1950), Art. 58; Ecuador, C.Co., Art. 317; Uruguay, Mezzera, op. cit. supra note
201, at 262 ff., Venezuela, C.Co., Art. 297.
... Argentina, C.Co., Art. 330; Bolivia, Decree of March 8, 1860, Art. 1187 (this article
also authorizes negotiation of nominative shares by endorsement without warranty); Brazil,
D-L 2627 (1940), Art. 27(a); Chile, C.Co., Art. 451 and L. of Sept. 11, 1878, Art. 3;
Colombia, L. 58 (1931), Art. 35 and Decree 2521 (1950), Art. 50; Ecuador, C.Co., Art.
317 and Decree 230 (May 15, 1936); Mexico, LGSM, Arts. 128-129; Peru, C.Co., Art.
169 (by implication) and Ejecutoria of Oct. 25, 1945, "El Derecho," Arequipa, 1947, p.
800; Uruguay, C.Co., Art. 414; Venezuela, C.Co., Art. 296.
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in the laws of Panama' and Chile, ' which expressly allow the emission
of non-par stock. In practice, however, non-par stock has seldom
been used and it has been unfavorably commented upon by several
Latin American legal writers."9
The Latin American regulation of preferred stock is generally
deficient. Only about ten Latin American countries expressly autho-
rize the issuance of preferred stock."'0 However, in most of the
other countries it is common practice to issue preferred stock, and
this practice has not been questioned.
Generally speaking, the following types of preferences may be
accorded:
(1) preference as to dividends, which may be cumulative or non-
cumulative. The general rule is that preferred dividend stock
is participating, but there seems no reason why a different rule
could not be established in the bylaws of the corporation.
(2) preference as to liquidation.
(3) preference as to dividends and as to liquidation.
(4) preference as to vote, i.e., by granting the preferred stock a
higher number of votes.
The general rule appears to be that preferred stock and, generally,
any kind of stock, may not be deprived of the right to
vote, 6 ' but an exception to this rule is found in the laws of Argen-
tina and Brazil."2 In Mexico, as a matter of law, the right to vote
of the preferred stock may be limited, but it may not be completely
abolished, preferred stock being always entitled to vote in the so-
called "extraordinary" meetings of shareholders when they are called
for the purpose of approving a fundamental change in the organiza-
tion of the corporation." 3 A somewhat similar rule is found in the
laws of Chile and Uruguay. " It is also important to observe that
in Mexico if a limitation of the right to vote is imposed upon the
2S Chile, D-L 251 (May 20, 1931), Art. 117(2); Mexico, LGSM, Art. 125 (IV);
Panami, L. 32 (1927), Art. 22.
259 See, e.g., 1 Rodriguez, Sociedades, ed. cit., 339 (Mexico) and Olavarria Manual de
Derecho Comercial, p. 157 (1950).262 The laws of the following countries, among others, authorize preferred stock: Argen-
tina, C.Co., Art. 334; Brazil, D-L 2627 (1940), Arts. 9-10; Chile, D-L 251 (May 20,
1931), Arts. 103-104; Colombia, Decree 2521 (1950), Arts. 169-173; D-L 2831 (1952),
Art. 12, L. 58 (1931), Art. 36; Mexico, LGSM, Arts. 112-113; Venezuela, C.Co., Arts.
292-293.
... Cf. authorities cited note 264 infra.
262 Argentina, C.Co., Art. 352; Brazil, D-L 2627 (1940), Art. 9.
'88 Mexico, LGSM, Art. 113.2
14Chile, D-L 251 (May 20, 1931), Art. 103; Uruguay, Mezzera, op. cit. supra note 201
at 269. A similar rule seems to be applied in Venezuela. Cf. Tax Factors in Basing Inter-
national Business Abroad, Harvard, 1957, p. 175.
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preferred stock, it must be compensated for with the following
minimum advantages:2.
(1) a cumulative preferred stock dividend of 5 % of the par value
of each share; and
(2) liquidation preferences.
The laws of several countries accord pre-emptive rights on behalf
of the shareholders in case of issues of preferred stock or of prior
preferred stock,"' and the Brazilian statute has further established a
right of appraisal on behalf of the shareholders who dissented when
the vote for the approval of the issue of preferred or of prior stock
was taken.6 "
I. Purchase of Own Shares by Corporation
Generally, a corporation may purchase its own shares only with
funds taken out of earnings. " ' However, there are some exceptions
to this rule. So, for example, the LGSM of Mexico prohibits, in so
many words, the acquisition of its own shares by a corporation. The
only two exceptions are:
(1) amortization of shares by "variable capital" corporations; and
(2) judicial adjudication of shares as a result of debts owed to the
corporation.'
IV. CORPORATE OPERATION
A. Liability of the Shareholders
The general rule, accepted by all the Latin American countries, is
that the liability of the shareholders is limited to the amount paid to
the corporation-or promised to be paid to the corporation-as con-
sideration for the shares of stock. In this connection there is no
difference between the American and the Latin American laws. The
limited liability of the shareholders is precisely one of the essential
elements of the corporate type of business association.
There is, however, an important exception to this universally
accepted rule. The "founding" shareholders, i.e., those who incorpo-
rated the enterprise, may be personally liable if the corporation
was not organized in compliance with the requirements set forth in
the statutes, as heretofore noticed in the discussion of the substantive
and formal requirements for incorporation."'
'a5 Authority cited note 263 supra.
266 Cf., e.g., Colombia, D-L 2831 (1952), Art. 12.
267 D-L 2627 (1940), Art. 107.
261 Colombia, L. 58 (1921), Art. 31; Chile, D-L 251 (May 20, 1931), Art. 103; Peru,
C.Co., Art. 173; Venezuela, C.Co., Art. 263.
... Mexico, LGSM, Arts. 134 and 138.
270 See pp. 204-205 supra.
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B. Meetings of the Shareholders
The laws of some Latin American countries, e.g., Peru,"71 have
established only a very limited number of rules concerning the meet-
ings of shareholders; in these countries it is up to the shareholders
to determine in detail in the bylaws the rules under which the
meetings must be held. However, even in these legal systems, there
are some basic mandatory precepts which may not be modified by
the shareholders.
The laws of Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Mexico, and Venezuela...
contain fairly detailed regulations governing the meeting of share-
holders. Some of the regulations are mandatory and may not be
modified in the bylaws, but most of them are not mandatory. This
analysis will deal mainly with the mandatory regulations, and among
them, with those most commonly found in the several codes and
statutes.
In Latin America, just as in the United States, the supreme organ
of a corporation is the meeting of shareholders. However, the power
of this organ is undoubtedly greater south of the Rio Grande. For
example, in Latin America the declaration of dividends is within
the jurisdiction of the shareholders," 3 and the amendment of the by-
laws of the corporation is an exclusive, non-delegable function of
the shareholders. 4
The meetings of shareholders are of two different kinds: ordinary
and extraordinary. As a general rule, an ordinary meeting must be
held at least once a year for the following purposes:...
(1) discussion, approval, or modification of the inventory, balance
sheet, and report which the directors are obligated to present
every year for the consideration of the shareholders, and dis-
cussion, modification, or approval of the report of the super-
visors;
(2) appointment or removal of directors and supervisors, if
necessary;
(3) discussion and decision about the purposes to which the net
271 C.Co., Arts. 161, 166, 177-181.
272 In connection with these countries, see particularly Argentina, C.Co., Arts. 347 ff.;
Brazil, D-L 2627 (1940), Arts. 74 ff.; Colombia, Decree 2521 (1950), Arts. 82 ff.; Mexico,
LGSM, Arts. 178 ff.; Venezuela, C.Co., Arts. 271 ff.
273 Argentina, C.Co., Art. 361 (by implication); Brazil, D-L 2627 (1940), Art. 131 (by
implication); Colombia, Decree 2521 (1950), Art. 88(e).274 Argentina, C.Co., Art. 354; Brazil, D-L 2627 (1940), Art. 104; Colombia, Decree
2521 (1950), Arts. 87 and 251 (2); Mexico, LGSM, Art. 182; Venezuela, C.Co., Art. 280.
275Argentina, C.Co., Art. 347(2); Brazil, D-L 2627 (1940), Art. 98; Chile, Decree
4705, Arts. 2(4), 20; Colombia, Decree 2521 (1950), Art. 83; Ecuador, C.Co., Art.
305; Mexico, LGSM, Art. 181; Venezuela, C.Co., Art. 274.
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income of the corporation shall be applied and, particularly, if
dividends should be declared and how they will be paid; and
(4) any other topics included in the notice calling the meeting.
The board of directors or the manager is obligated to publish
notice of the meetings in a newspaper of the domicile of the cor-
poration, with due anticipation (generally 15 days).'" The notice
must state: (1) the place where the meeting will be held; (2) the
date and the hour of such meeting; and (3) the subjects to be
discussed at the meeting.
As a general rule, the Latin American laws accord a right of
inspection to the shareholders during the period between
the giving of notice of the meeting and the date of the meeting.
In pursuance of this right, the shareholders may inspect books and
documents of the corporation which bear some relation to the sub-
jects to be discussed at the meeting. For this purpose the books and
documents must be kept in the offices of the corporation at the
disposal of the shareholders."
The quorum required to transact any business at a meeting is the
one determined in the bylaws of the corporation. If nothing is
provided in the bylaws, the quorum usually required by the Latin
American laws is one-half of the outstanding shares of the corpora-
tion. If the necessary quorum is not obtained in the first meeting, a
second meeting may be called, and in this second meeting business
can be transacted with the presence of any number of shares." 8
As a general rule, each outstanding share of stock is entitled to
one vote. However, as we have seen, in most countries it is permis-
sible for the corporation to issue "preferred" stock with more than
one vote, and in some jurisdictions the voting power of preferred
stock may be restricted, all in accordance with the rules discussed pre-
viously."" Also, in connection with the method of voting, three other
principles must be mentioned. First is the rule that directors may
not vote for the approval of the balance sheet or report pre-
278 Cf., e.g., Argentina, C.Co., Arts. 349, 351; Brazil, D-L 2627 (1940), Art. 99;
Chile, Decree 4705, Art. 22; Colombia, Decree 2521 (1950), Art. 84; Mexico, LGSM, Art.
186; Uruguay, Decree of Dec. 18, 1947, Arts. 9-11; Venezuela, C.Co., Art. 277.
.. Argentina, C.Co., Art. 362; Brazil, D-L 2627 (1940), Art. 99; Chile, Decree 4705,
Art. 21; Colombia, Decree 2521 (1950), Art. 57; Mexico, LGSM, Art. 186; Peru, C.Co.,
Art. 166; Venezuela, C.Co., Art. 284.
2" Argentina, C.Co., Art. 351 (no quorum was fixed by the code, but it was provided
that if in the first meeting the quorum determined in the bylaws is not obtained, then a
second meeting may be held, with any quorum); Chile, Decree 4705, Art. 26; Colombia,
Decree 2521 (1950), Art. 86 (half plus one of the shares); Ecuador, C.Co., Art. 305;
Mexico, LGSM, Art. 189; Venezuela, C.Co., Art. 273.
279 See p. 212-13 supra.
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sented by them or in connection with their potential liability."'
Secondly, the laws of a few countries provide that if a shareholder
has a personal interest -which is opposed to the interests of the cor-
poration in a particular matter he may not vote when the issue comes
up for decision; if he does vote, the motion will be void if it would
not have been approved without his vote."' Finally, the laws of Ar-
gentina, Colombia, and Uruguay provide that no shareholder shall
have more than a certain maximum number of votes."" Thus, for
example, the Argentina Code of Commerce provides that no share-
holder may have more than 10% of the possible votes in a corpora-
tion or more than 2/10 of the votes present in a particular meeting.
The general rule in Latin America is to the effect that at any
meeting of shareholders, every shareholder having the right to vote
may vote by proxy appointed by an instrument in writing addressed
to the corporation. However (and on this point the Latin American
laws differ from the American laws), no proxies may be given on
behalf of members of the board of directors. 8
The number of votes necessary for the approval of ordinary
motions is to be determined in the bylaws of the corporation. In
Chile and some other countries, if nothing is said in this respect
in the bylaws, ordinary motions may be approved by a majority of
the shares present at the meeting."' It must be noted that the laws
of several countries, e.g., Venezuela, require a higher majority of
votes and a higher quorum for the discussion and approval of
amendments to the bylaws, particularly if they involve a reorgani-
zation or the voluntary dissolution of the corporation prior to the
end of the term for which it was organized. 8 '
Most of the rules discussed above in connection with the ordinary
meetings of shareholders are also applicable to the so-called "extra-
ordinary" meetings of shareholders. In perhaps a majority of the
Latin American countries the term "extraordinary meeting" is used
to signify those meetings other than the annual meetings, which are
called for the discussion of matters requiring speedy action. On the
280 See, e.g., Argentina, C.Co., Art. 356; Mexico, LGSM, Art. 197.
28. Mexico, LGSM, Art. 196.
.. Argentina, C.Co., Art. 350(2); Colombia, L. 58 (1931), Art. 28; Uruguay, C.Co.,
Art. 420.
283Argentina, C.Co., Art. 355; Brazil, D-L 2627 (1940), Art. 91(§1); Chile, Decree
4705, Art. 25 (no restriction against directors); Colombia, Decree 2521 (1950), Art. 106;
Ecuador, C.Co., Art. 314; Mexico, LGSM, Art. 192; Uruguay, L. 3545 (July 19, 1909),
Art. 2 and Decree of July 16, 1943, Art. 1; Venezuela, C.Co., Art. 285.
284 Decree 4705, Art. 26; see also, Argentina, C.Co., Art. 350; Mexico, LGSM, Art. 189;
Colombia, Decree 2521 (1950), Art. 86.
.s Venezuela, C.Co., Art. 280; see also, Argentina, C.Co., Art. 354; Colombia, Decree
2521 (1950), Art. 87.
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other hand, in some countries such as Mexico and Uruguay, the term
"extraordinary meetings" means those special meetings that must
be called for the discussion of fundamental changes in organization
or other consequential actions. In the countries belonging to the
second group, the laws require a special higher quorum for the "extra-
ordinary" meetings and the approval of motions by a higher majority
of votes."6
C. Protection of Minority Shareholders
The laws of several Latin American countries contain rules and
principles for the protection of the rights of minority shareholders,
of which the following three are perhaps the most significant:
(1) The minority shareholders may appoint one of the members of
the board of directors or one of the supervisors. In this connection the
LGSM of Mexico provides that minority shareholders shall b2 entitled
to appoint at least one director when they represent at least 25 7 of
the capital of the corporation, 287 and the Decree-Law of Brazil states
that minority shareholders representing one-fifth or more of the
capital of a corporation are entitled to appoint one of the members
of the supervisory council. '
(2) If the shareholders adopt a resolution which is contrary to the
law or the bylaws of the corporation, the dissenting shareholders,
under certain conditions, have the right to challenge the motion in
court, and while the suit is pending, they may ask for a decree of the
court suspending the resolution until final decision is taken.'"
(3) The statutes of Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, and some other
countries have established a right of appraisal on behalf of dissenting
shareholders in case of fundamental changes in organization, such
as transformation, merger, and change of the object of exploitation.
In pursuance of this right the shareholders who dissented have their
shares appraised and paid by the corporation. 2"° The nature and
requisites of this right of appraisal are similar to those provided under
the corporation acts of many American states; however, it must be
noticed as an important difference that the price to be paid for the
shares is their book value in accordance with the last balance sheet.
In the United States, on the other hand, the price is usually the "fair"
price, which is determined by taking into account not only the book
288 Mexico, LGSM, Arts. 182, 190; Uruguay, L. 3545 (July 19, 1909), Art. 1.
... Mexico, LGSM, Art. 144.
2"SD-L 2627 (1940), Art. 125.
289 See, e.g., Argentina, C.Co., Art. 353; Mexico, LGSM, Art. 201.29
°Argentina, C.Co., Art. 354; Brazil, D-L 2627 (1940), Art. 107; Mexico, LGSM,
Art. 206.
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value of the shares but many other factors as well, such as the market
price and the so-called "investment" value of the stock.
D. Directors
Most of the Latin American codes and statutes contain a very
limited number of provisions concerning directors, 9' and only a few
of these provisions are mandatory. Thus, the system of manage-
ment has been left, for the most part, to the discretion of the in-
corporators and the shareholders.
Although it is possible in most jurisdictions to appoint just one
director,"' the administration of large corporations is customarily
put into the hands of a board of directors, known as junta directiva
or consejo de admninistraci6n. Generally speaking, there are no restric-
tions based upon nationality for membership on a board of directors,
and except in Argentina... the directors need not be shareholders."'
On the other hand, the codes and statutes of several countries prohibit
the appointment as directors of persons who have been convicted of
certain crimes, e.g., swindling."'
Directors are appointed by the shareholders and they can be re-
moved by the shareholders at any time, with or without cause.' 9s
Usually they may be appointed only for a limited period of time
(e.g., 6 years in Brazil and 3 years in Argentina), but all laws author-
ize the re-election of the members of the board."'
Before commencing their duties the directors may be required
under the bylaws, and sometimes by the statutes, to give bond in
order to secure their potential liability."' In order to satisfy this re-
quirement shares of stock are usually pledged to the corporation.
"'. The basic provision generally contained in the Latin American Codes and statutes in
connection with directors is framed in these or similar words: "A corporation is managed
by one or more directors, elected for a limited period of time (temporales), subject to
removal (revocales) and who may or may not be shareholders." (Venezuela, C.Co., Art.
242). See similar provisions in Bolivia, Decree of March 8, 1860, Art. 1193; Chile, C.Co.,
Art. 457; Uruguay, C.Co., Art. 405.
92 See, e.g., Argentina, C.Co., Art. 335; Brazil, D-L 2627 (1940), Art. 116.
"9 Argentina, C.Co., Art. 336.
194 Authorities cited note 291 supra.
2" See, e.g., Mexico, LGSM, Art. 151.
"'aArgentina, C.Co., Art. 336; Bolivia, Decree of March 8, 1860, Art. 1193; Brazil,
D-L 2627 (1940), Art. 116; Chile, C.Co., Art. 457; Colombia, Decree 2521 (1950), Art.
108; Ecuador, C.Co., Art. 286; Mexico, LGSM, Art. 142; Peru, C.Co., Art. 163; Uruguay,
C.Co., Art. 405; Venezuela, C.Co., Art. 242.
29 Argentina, C.Co., Art. 366 (may be re-elected only if re-election was authorized in
bylaws); Brazil, D-L 2627 (1940), Art. 116(c); Chile, Decree 4703, Art. 15 (one year,
if no term stated in bylaws); Colombia, Decree 2521 (1950), Art. 108 (directors must be
appointed for "limited period" but may be re-elected indefinitely); Venezuela, C.Co., Art.
267 (two years unless otherwise provided for in bylaws).
2'Argentina, C.Co., Art. 339; Brazil, D-L 2627 (1940), Art. 117; Chile, D-L 251
(May 20, 1931), Art. 94; Mexico, LGSM, Art. 152; Venezuela, C.Co., Art. 244.
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The directors are agents of the corporation and have the rights
and obligations usually granted to and imposed upon agents. 99 The
authority of directors is more limited in Latin America than in the
United States, mainly because of the fact that in Latin America the
shareholders have very broad powers of direction, as previously men-
tioned."' The powers of the board of directors are limited by the
object or purpose of the corporation and by the provisions contained
in the bylaws; also, in several countries the directors may not con-
vey real estate or establish liens upon real estate without the consent
of the shareholders, unless expressly authorized to do so in the by-
laws or unless the purpose of the corporation is to deal in real estate.
Generally speaking, if the directors act beyond their powers or
against the limitations imposed by the law or bylaws, their act will
not bind the corporation, but will render them personally and jointly
liable to the corporation and third persons."'
There are certain acts and transactions which the laws of some
countries have specifically forbidden and which automatically deter-
mine the liability of the directors. Among others, the following may
be quoted as examples:... illegal distribution of dividends; purchase of
shares with funds which may not be devoted to that purpose; and,
under some statutes, the purchase and sale of shares of the corporation
by the directors on their own account for purposes of speculation.
In the exercise of their functions the directors are liable not only
for willful acts but also for negligence. The standard of care re-
quired of a director is that of a reasonable prudent man in the han-
dling of his personal affairs ("cuidado de un buen padre de familia
en el manejo de sus propios negocios.").
The directors owe a duty of loyalty to the corporation. As a
consequence of this duty, the Latin American statutes have estab-
lished that whenever a director has a personal interest in a particular
transaction involving the corporation, he must make disclosure to the
other directors and may not vote in connection with the transaction."'
In case of violation of this rule he will be liable to the corporation
and to third persons. Also, some statutes expressly prohibit a director
... See discussion in 2 Fernandez, Codigo, ed. cit., p. 486.
300 See p. 212-15 supra.
.01 Cf. authorities cited note 302 infra.
..
2The following articles make reference to several aspects of the liability of the direc-
tors: Argentina, C.Co., Arts. 337, 338, 343, 345, 364; Bolivia, Decree of March 8, 1860,
Art. 1178; Brazil, Arts. 119 ff. and 131; Chile, C.Co., Art. 347(2); Colombia, Decree
2521 (1950), Arts. 111, 120, 121; Ecuador, C.Co., Arts. 301, 344; Mexico, LGSM, Art.
156 if,; Peru, C.Co., Art. 165; Uruguay, C.Co., Arts. 408(3), 417, 418(2); L. 2.230,
June 2, 1893, Arts. 7-12 and 76, 77; Venezuela, C.Co., Arts. 243 (2) and 268.
30"Argentina, C.Co., Art. 345; Brazil, D-L 2627 (1940), Art. 120; Chile, D-L 251(May 20, 1931), Art. 100; Mexico, LGSM, Art. 156 and Venezuela, C.Co., Art. 269.
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from contracting directly or indirectly with the corporation. Finally,
there are provisions in some codes and statutes forbidding a director
to engage or to participate actively in a competitive business.
Generally speaking, the problem of whether the shareholders may
sue the directors in case of liability is a matter insufficiently regulated
in most of the Latin American countries. There is no doubt that
a shareholder has the right to sue the directors if their illegal
action has caused him special, individual damage. In this case the
shareholder acts in his own name, in pursuance of a personal,
individual action. On the other hand, difficult problems arise in
connection with the availability of derivative suits. In Brazil if
the corporation does not start a lawsuit against the directors with-
in six months after the next meeting of shareholders, any share-
holder may enforce the liability of the directors in a derivative
suit." ' In Argentina if the act of the directors is illegal or con-
trary to the bylaws it may not be ratified by the shareholders and
any shareholder may sue in a derivative suit."' In Mexico derivative
suits are not allowed unless shareholders representing at least 3 3 % of
the capital of the corporation will join in the action."'
In some countries, such as Argentina, a director may avoid liability
by merely abstaining from participating in the approval of the illegal
motion;'. in some other countries he must show, in addition to this,
that he protested against the motion and that he gave notice of the
illegal action to the president, manager, or the shareholders.0 "'
E. Supervision
The supervision of corporations may be exercised in two different
ways: (1) by the government through specialized agencies; or (2)
by the shareholders themselves through the appointment of auditors
or supervisors. Several Latin American countries, e.g., Argentina,
Chile, and Colombia, have combined these two systems by creating
specialized governmental agencies (known as Inspecci6n General de
Justicia in Argentina, and Superintendencia de Sociedades in Chile
and Colombia) entrusted with the supervision of corporations and
by providing, at the same time, that the shareholders must appoint
one or more supervisors (sindicos o revisores fiscales) to oversee
the management. In some other countries, on the other hand,
314 D-L 2627 (1940), Art. 123.
...2 Fernandez Codigo, ed. cit., commentary to Art. 337.
306LGSM, Art. 163.
30 7 C.Co., Art. 337(2) and Mexico, LGSM, Art. 159.
'a'See, e.g., Brazil, D-L 2627 (1940), Art. 122; Mexico, LGSM, Art. 160 (notice to
supervisors).
[Vol. 14
1960] LATIN AMERICAN BUSINESS ASSOCIATION 219
only this latter system (private supervision) is required, there being
no state supervision.
The powers of the governmental agencies which control corpora-
tions in those countries where these agencies have been established
by law are very broad and important. In the first place these govern-
mental agencies oversee the organization of the corporation and grant
or deny, or determine the granting or denial of, permission for the
establishment of a corporation. In the second place, they have broad
powers of supervision over the corporation once it is organized, in-
cluding the authority to examine books and papers, impose fines,
and even to revoke permission to operate or ask for the
dissolution of the corporation in cases of serious violations of the
law and in cases of insolvency."'
Private supervision of corporations is done through the appoint-
ment by the shareholders of one or more supervisors or auditors
(sindico comisarios, o revisores fiscales). If several supervisors are
appointed they will constitute a body known as consejo de vigilancia.
The supervisors or auditors must check on the activities of the direc-
tors and managers and must denounce to the shareholders any irreg-
ularities they may find. Particularly, the supervisors are obligated to
analyze the inventories and the balance sheets and report on
them, as well as on the general operation of the corporation, at the
annual meeting of shareholders, or at a specially called meeting if
the circumstances demand it.
Finally, it should be mentioned that the supervisors may be liable
to the association and to third persons for the improper discharge
of their functions, under rules similar to those discussed already in
connection with directors and managers."o
F. Reserve Funds and Dividends
The statutes and codes of most Latin American countries provide
that a certain percentage of the earnings of the corporation must be
devoted to the creation of a reserve fund known as "legal reserve
fund" (fondo de reserva legal). So, for example, the Code of Com-
merce of Argentina provides that at least 2% of the net earnings shall
... Argentina, Decree of April 27, 1923, Regulatory of the Inspecci6n General de Justicia;
Colombia, L. 58 (1931), Decree 2521 (1950), Arts 259 ff. and Decree 2831, 1952; Chile,
D-L 251, May 20, 1931, particularly Arts. 1, 2, 83 ff. See also Bolivia, D-L of April 28,
1938 and Uruguay, L. 11.418 of April 29, 1950, Decree of Dec. 4, 1950 and Decree of
Dec. 18, 1947 (grants authorization to the Oficina de Recordaci6n del Impuesto a las
Ganancias Elevadas for supervising corporations).
"' In connection with the supervisors, cf. Argentina, C.Co., Art. 340; Brazil, D-L
2627 (1940), Arts. 124 ff.; Colombia, Decree 2521 (1950), Arts. 134 ff.; Uruguay,
Resolution of May 6, 1949 (not required to have supervisors); Mexico, LGSM, Arts. 164
ff.; Venezuela, C.Co., Arts 287 and 309-311.
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
be devoted to the creation of a reserve fund which must be equal to
10% of the subscribed capital. This "legal reserve fund" is a means
to increase the margin of security for creditors and it may be used
to pay losses.
As a general rule, dividends may be distributed only out of net
earned surplus."1 Therefore, capital surplus created by a write-up
of the estimated value of the assets of the association, or a devaluation
surplus, or any type of surplus other than earned surplus, may not
be used for dividends. On the other hand, any kind of earned sur-
plus, whether it is ordinary or extraordinary, is subject to distri-
bution as dividends.
The declaration of dividends is made by the shareholders, not by
the board of directors."' However, the distribution of illegal divi-
dends may render the directors personally liable."' Furthermore, in
some countries such as Argentina, dividends illegally paid may be
recovered from the shareholders, but the action for recovery is sub-
ject to a short statute of limitations (3 years in Argentina, for
example)."'
"' Argentina, C.Co., Art. 364; Bolivia, Decree of March 8, 1860, Art. 1198; Chile,
D-L 251 (May 20, 1931), Art. 108; Colombia, Decree 2521 (1950), Art. 182 and C.Co.,
Art. 588; Ecuador, C.Co., Art. 303 (makes a limited exception to the general rule);
Uruguay, C.Co., Art. 418; Venezuela, C.Co., Art. 307. In Mexico it seems to be possible
to declare dividends out of capital surplus. 1 Rodriguez, Sociedades, ed. cit., p. 475.
312 See p. 212 supra.
aa See authorities cited note 302 supra.
"' 2 Fernandez, C6digo, ed. cit., pp. 552 ff.
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